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    DA-01 - Blockchain, Web3 and Digital Assets - Legal Ontology, Governance Complexity, and the Limits of Analogical Regulation

    Evelyse Carvalho-Ribas6 Aug 2026
    Este artículo aún no está disponible en ES — mostrando la versión en EN.(También disponible en: EN)

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    Evelyse Carvalho-Ribas
    DA-01 · DIGITAL ASSETS & TOKENISATION

    Blockchain, Web3 and Digital Assets: Legal Ontology, Governance Complexity, and the Limits of Analogical Regulation

    Legal Ontology · Multi-Layer Governance · Limits of Analogical Regulation

    Series
    ECR-Digital Assets Series · DA
    Author
    Evelyse Carvalho-Ribas
    Credentials
    PhD in Law, University of Leeds, School of Law, 2026
    Practice
    20+ years across EU · UK · Australia · Americas · Asia-Pacific
    Published Through
    MoroAK Professional Knowledge Infrastructure
    Year
    2026

    Evelyse Carvalho-Ribas

    PRIMARY AUTHORITY DOMAIN
    Cultural-creative tax incentives · Structural fiscal access constraints (SFACs) · Cross-border cultural-fiscal governance · National frameworks · EU internal market law · UNESCO 2005 Convention · Bilateral treaty practice.
    SECONDARY DOMAIN
    Digital and tokenised assets · National financial regulation · Supranational supervisory frameworks · International tax coordination · Technological architecture · Governance design.
    DOMAIN SYNERGIES
    Both domains are unified by the same structural problem: complexity at the intersection of national, supranational, and international legal orders — where regulatory fragmentation, administrative opacity, and institutional misalignment prevent legitimate access to legal, fiscal, and financial frameworks. In fiscal governance, this manifests as SFACs blocking cross-border access to tax incentives. In digital assets, it manifests as the absence of a coherent governance-grade framework linking legal classification, regulatory supervision, technical design, and cross-border value flows. Evelyse Carvalho-Ribas' analytical methodology — multi-relational, governance-first, jurisdiction-aware — applies with equal rigour across both.
    UNIQUE FRAMEWORK CONTRIBUTION
    Originator of the SFAC concept (Structural Fiscal Access Constraints) — the first taxonomised framework for diagnosing why cross-border tax incentives systematically fail. Creator of the CCTIM (Cultural-Creative Tax Incentive Model), a soft-governance reform architecture reducing SFACs without requiring legal harmonisation or fiscal sovereignty surrender. Creator of a governance-grade interpretative framework for digital and tokenised assets capable of linking legal classification, regulatory supervision, technical design, and cross-border value flows within a coherent analytical model.
    ACADEMIC CREDENTIAL
    PhD in Law, University of Leeds, School of Law, 2026. Thesis: “Toward a Shared Coordinate Framework for Cultural-Creative Tax Incentives.” Examined across national, bilateral, EU, and UNESCO legal frameworks. 25+ jurisdictions analysed. LLM in International Commercial and Business Law, University of East Anglia, School of Law, 2007.
    PROFESSIONAL CREDENTIAL
    Qualified Lawyer in Brazil and Portugal. Foreign Lawyer in England and Wales. 20+ year career built on the legal, tax, and regulatory architecture of two core pillars: tax incentives and digital assets & tokenisation. Working directly with national authorities, regulators, and institutions to surface legal and administrative blind spots and address misalignment between domestic regimes and international obligations. With international tax lawyers and advisers, accountants and financial advisers, policymakers and government bodies, institutions and foundations. In digital assets, active since 2015, working with founders and builders across tokenised ecosystems (L1-L3), DeFi, AI, legal and compliance teams, across real estate, agriculture, carbon, infrastructure, IP, education, health, and the arts.
    INSTITUTIONAL AFFILIATIONS & NETWORKS
    University of Leeds (PhD, School of Law) · University of East Anglia (LLM, School of Law) · IFA — International Fiscal Association · IBFD — International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation · IBA — International Bar Association · OECD tax policy and governance networks · UNESCO cultural policy and governance networks · European Film Forum · European Audiovisual Observatory · CISAC · WIPO — World Intellectual Property Organization · Digital assets and tokenisation regulatory networks (EU, UK, Lusophone markets) · MoroAK — Co-Founder & Educator Zero · Active practice across EU · UK · Australia · Americas (Canada · US · Mexico · Brazil · Chile) · Asia-Pacific (Singapore · Hong Kong · Japan).
    PUBLISHING INFRASTRUCTURE
    Published through MoroAK Professional Knowledge Infrastructure · moroak.com · All courses, cohorts, papers, and digital toolkits available through Evelyse Carvalho-Ribas' educator profile on MoroAK's platform. For advisory enquiries and mandate scoping, contact through evelyse@moroak.com.

    Abstract

    The rapid expansion of blockchain, Web3, and digital asset systems has intensified regulatory activity across multiple jurisdictions, yet persistent legal uncertainty remains. This paper addresses a foundational structural problem: digital assets and tokenized systems are frequently treated as discrete regulatory objects, while in practice they operate as multi-layered ecosystems spanning legal, technical, economic, fiscal, and governance dimensions. Regulatory and advisory failures often arise not from gaps in legislation, but from the inability to analyse these systems across all layers simultaneously.

    Tokenization is not a single legal field, nor a homogeneous regulatory category. It constitutes an ecosystem in which national financial regulation, supranational supervisory frameworks, international tax coordination, technological architecture, and governance design interact continuously. Legal analysis that focuses exclusively on one layer—most commonly domestic financial classification—fails to capture how decisions taken at one level generate legal, fiscal, and enforcement consequences across others. This structural misalignment contributes to inconsistent classification, regulatory arbitrage concerns, enforcement risk, and institutional uncertainty.

    This paper adopts a comparative introductory legal and institutional approach, drawing on regulatory regimes and supervisory practices in the European Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, and selected Asia-Pacific jurisdictions, alongside international frameworks related to anti-money laundering, tax transparency, and cross-border cooperation. Rather than presenting a compliance guide or jurisdiction-specific checklist, the analysis focuses on how legal systems conceptualise digital assets, how administrative authorities operationalise those concepts, and where governance failures emerge when legal, technical, and economic layers are assessed in isolation.

    Grounded in applied professional practice across cross-border digital asset projects, the paper demonstrates how token classification, licensing obligations, tax treatment, and enforcement exposure are shaped by the interaction between national law, supranational regulation, institutional mandates, and system architecture. Particular attention is given to governance structures, which frequently determine regulatory outcomes yet remain under-theorised in legal analysis.

    The paper introduces the need for a governance-grade interpretative framework capable of linking legal classification, regulatory supervision, technical design, and cross-border value flows within a coherent analytical model. It is intended for advanced professional audiences—including lawyers, tax advisers, regulators, supervisory authorities, policy designers, and senior compliance officers—who are required to decide, classify, approve, audit, supervise, or regulate digital asset structures. By framing blockchain and Web3 systems as governance ecosystems rather than isolated legal objects, this paper establishes the conceptual foundation for a non-reductive, multi-jurisdictional approach to digital asset regulation and practice.


    Blockchain · Web3 · Digital Assets · Tokenization · Governance · Legal Ontology · Analogical Regulation · Multi-Layer Framework · Cross-Border · MiCA · Institutional Discretion

    Carvalho-Ribas, Evelyse. ‘Blockchain, Web3 and Digital Assets: Legal Ontology, Governance Complexity, and the Limits of Analogical Regulation’. DA-01. ECR-Digital Assets Series. Published through MoroAK Professional Knowledge Infrastructure, 2026. Available at moroak.com.

    Definitions

    This section establishes the operative definitions used throughout the paper to anchor interpretation within a coherent analytical framework, ensure continuity with prior papers, and prevent misclassification of the analysis as technical implementation guidance, compliance checklists, investment advice, or jurisdiction-specific tax planning. The definitions adopted are functional, governance-oriented, and deliberately system-neutral. They do not reflect technological advocacy or any single regulatory authority’s classificatory preferences. Where official legal definitions exist, they are referenced accordingly. Where definitions are developed for the purposes of this paper, they are expressly identified as workable analytical definitions constructed to support governance-grade legal analysis.1

    Blockchain
    For the purposes of this paper, refers to a distributed ledger technology in which cryptographically signed transactions are recorded in data blocks that are sequentially linked, replicated across a network of nodes, and updated through a consensus mechanism, creating a tamper-evident and tamper-resistant record of information.2 This paper adopts the term in a technology-neutral legal sense, consistent with regulatory usage in multiple jurisdictions, rather than a specific architectural or protocol-based definition. The term encompasses both permissionless and permissioned systems, regardless of the degree of decentralisation claimed or achieved in practice.
    Web3
    Commonly designates an emergent iteration of the internet characterised by decentralised architectures (notably public blockchains), token-based economic coordination, and user control over data and digital assets, in contrast to the platform-centred and data-extractive models associated with ‘Web 2.0’. Under this paper, the term Web3 is not treated as a legally defined category. Rather, it is employed as a contextual descriptor to capture the convergence of blockchain infrastructure, tokenised economic incentives, and decentralised governance narratives. Its use does not imply regulatory status, legal recognition, or exemption from existing legal frameworks.
    Digital Asset
    Refers to any item of value that is created, stored, or represented in digital form and that can be owned or controlled, including data, digitised content, and digitally represented rights or entitlements, which may or may not rely on distributed ledger technology. This paper uses digital asset as an umbrella analytical term, consistent with its usage by international standard-setting bodies and legislators,3 while recognising that depending on its characteristics, a digital asset may fall within financial, tax, property, or contractual legal regimes.
    Crypto-Asset
    Refers to a digital representation of value or rights that uses cryptography and distributed ledger or similar technology to enable secure recording, transfer, and storage, and that can be used for investment, payment, or access to goods, services, or networks. Where relevant, the paper references statutory definitions adopted in specific regimes, including the European Union’s Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCA),4 while emphasising that such definitions are jurisdiction-bound and do not resolve cross-border governance issues.
    Token
    In the context of distributed ledger technology, a digitally recorded unit that embodies or represents certain value, rights, or claims—such as payment, utility, or asset-backed interests—and that can be issued, held, and transferred on a blockchain or comparable infrastructure. The paper treats tokens as multi-functional instruments, not as legal categories in themselves. A token’s legal treatment depends on the rights, obligations, and economic realities it creates or reflects, rather than its technical label or nomenclature.5
    Tokenization
    Refers to the process by which assets, claims, or rights are represented in the form of digital tokens recorded on a distributed ledger or comparable infrastructure, enabling their fractionalisation, transfer, and settlement through cryptographically secured, ledger-based transactions. This paper rejects the treatment of tokenization as a single legal field. Instead, it approaches tokenization as a multi-layer governance ecosystem in which legal, technical, economic, fiscal, and institutional dimensions interact.
    Governance
    Refers to the allocation and exercise of decision-making power, control, responsibility, and accountability within a digital asset system, including both formal and informal mechanisms.6 In this paper, governance is treated as a central analytical dimension, rather than a secondary organisational concern. Governance structures are understood to shape regulatory classification, liability exposure, supervisory assessment, and enforcement outcomes across jurisdictions.

    Conceptual Boundaries and Scope of the Paper
    This Paper Covers: legal and regulatory concepts relevant to blockchain, Web3, and digital assets; governance-oriented analysis of digital asset systems; comparative perspectives across national, supranational, and international frameworks; the interaction between law, administration, institutions, and system architecture.
    This Paper Does Not Cover: technical implementation of blockchain protocols or smart contracts; investment, trading, or financial product advice; step-by-step compliance guidance or licensing procedures; jurisdiction-specific tax planning or optimisation strategies; software development, coding, or system engineering practices. These exclusions are intentional and preserve the paper’s analytical, policy, and governance-oriented scope.

    Blockchain, Web3 and Digital Assets as a Governance Problem

    Legal and regulatory approaches to blockchain, Web3, and digital assets have often framed these systems primarily as technological innovations requiring incremental adaptation of existing rules, or as financial instruments to be classified within established regulatory categories such as securities, commodities, or payment instruments. While technology and finance are undoubtedly relevant, this paper proceeds from the premise that neither offers an adequate primary analytical lens. Persistent difficulties in legal qualification, regulatory supervision, and enforcement are not principally technical failures, but governance failures arising from misalignment between system design, institutional mandates, and legal interpretation.7

    At their core, many blockchain-based systems can be understood as governance arrangements. They organise decision-making authority, allocate economic rights, distribute operational responsibilities, and structure accountability through a combination of legal rules, technical architecture (including consensus and protocol design), and institutional or organisational oversight. The technical layer enables execution and coordination, but it does not, by itself, determine normative outcomes.8 Those outcomes emerge from how power, risk, and responsibility are distributed and exercised among participants, developers, intermediaries, service providers, users, and supervisory bodies, including the off-chain processes that determine protocol changes and system evolution.

    If digital asset systems are governance ecosystems—not isolated legal objects—then why do regulators across jurisdictions continue to classify them through single-layer analogies drawn from securities, payments, or commodity regimes?

    Regulatory analysis that privileges technology risks obscuring this reality. Accounts focused on decentralisation, cryptographic security, or on-chain voting mechanisms tend to assume that technical features can substitute for legal and institutional safeguards. In practice, however, supervisory assessments repeatedly return to questions of effective control, influence, economic benefit, and exposure to risk—questions that are fundamentally governance-based and cannot be resolved through technical description alone. The Federal Reserve Board’s 2024 analysis of permissionless blockchain governance confirmed this pattern, observing that governance dynamics in decentralised networks remain structured by identifiable actors and power relationships regardless of protocol design.9

    This governance dimension becomes visible precisely when one examines how different jurisdictions have chosen to frame the same underlying systems. The European Union’s Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCA)10 constructs a bespoke classificatory regime distinguishing asset-referenced tokens (ARTs), e-money tokens (EMTs), and utility tokens—each triggering distinct regulatory obligations for issuers and crypto-asset service providers. The United States, by contrast, has relied primarily on the investment-contract analysis derived from SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,11 applying a decades-old judicial test to technologically novel arrangements. The United Kingdom proceeds through the FCA’s perimeter analysis under FSMA 2000 and the Regulated Activities Order,12 supplemented by cryptoasset financial promotion rules effective October 202313 and the forthcoming Cryptoassets Regulations 2026.14 Singapore’s Monetary Authority regulates digital payment token services under the Payment Services Act 2019, recently expanded to cover custodial and transmission services.15 Hong Kong’s SFC operates a VASP licensing regime under AMLO, with nine platforms licensed by early 2025.16 Brazil enacted Lei 14.478/202217 with implementing regulations from the Banco Central,18 while Australia’s ASIC has issued substance-over-form guidance on when crypto-assets constitute financial products.19 Japan is currently transitioning its entire regulatory approach from the Payment Services Act to the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act.20

    Each of these frameworks engages with substantially similar technological and economic realities, yet each produces distinct classificatory outcomes shaped by national regulatory philosophies, institutional mandates, and legislative histories. What is classified as a utility token under MiCA may be treated as an investment contract under the Howey test, a digital payment token under Singapore’s PSA, or a ‘virtual asset’ under Brazil’s Lei 14.478—each designation carrying different obligations, liabilities, and enforcement consequences. This divergence is not an anomaly; it is a predictable consequence of treating multi-layer governance ecosystems as if they were single-layer regulatory objects. Elinor Ostrom’s foundational work on polycentric governance of complex economic systems provides an analytical precedent: systems involving multiple, overlapping centres of authority cannot be adequately governed through monocentric or single-regime frameworks without generating systematic coordination failures.21

    Governance-centred analysis also helps explain why regulatory outcomes vary significantly across jurisdictions despite formal convergence of rules in areas such as anti-money laundering, market integrity, and prudential standards. Differences in institutional mandates, supervisory cultures, enforcement priorities, and the scope of administrative discretion play a decisive role in how digital asset systems are evaluated and constrained in practice. Legal texts alone do not determine outcomes; interpretation, prioritisation, and application by competent authorities complete the regulatory process.22 Analytical models that ignore this institutional dimension risk being formally coherent yet operationally unreliable.

    This section therefore reframes blockchain, Web3, and digital assets as governance problems embedded in multi-layered systems, rather than as isolated legal or technical phenomena. This reframing is essential to understanding why regulatory classifications evolve over time, why compliance strategies may fail despite formal alignment with rules, and why governance design often determines liability and enforcement exposure more decisively than token nomenclature or protocol claims. By situating digital assets within a governance-centred analytical frame, the paper prepares the ground for the Multi-Layer Governance Framework for Blockchain and Digital Assets (Carvalho-Ribas), which provides a structured method for analysing how legal rules, administrative practices, institutional roles, and system architecture interact in practice.


    Structural Misalignment and the Limits of Analogical Regulation

    Regulatory responses to blockchain, Web3, and digital assets have relied extensively on analogical reasoning, classifying tokens by reference to pre-existing categories such as securities, commodities, payment instruments, electronic money, or utility/software services, often in line with the primary mandate of the assessing authority. Analogical classification is a legitimate and established legal technique, but its use as the dominant method in digital asset regulation has revealed significant structural limitations, particularly where it is not complemented by a governance-centred analysis of how these systems operate in practice.23

    Analogical regulation presupposes a sufficient degree of functional equivalence between the object being regulated and the reference legal category. In the context of digital assets, this assumption is only partially met. Many blockchain-based arrangements combine multiple functions—economic coordination, governance participation, access control, and value representation—within a single technical and organisational architecture. When regulatory analysis isolates one function (for example, investment-like features for securities law) and disregards others, the resulting legal classification often captures only a fragment of the system’s operative reality. The OECD’s analysis of decentralised finance identified precisely this fragmentation as a barrier to coherent regulatory intervention across jurisdictions.24

    This structural misalignment becomes particularly visible where identical or substantially similar token arrangements are classified differently across jurisdictions, or even by distinct authorities within the same jurisdiction. A single token can simultaneously be treated as a financial instrument for market-conduct purposes, as a commodity under derivatives rules, as a means of payment for anti-money-laundering obligations, and as an intangible asset for accounting and tax purposes. Each classification may be defensible within its own legal silo, yet together they generate regulatory incoherence, fragmented obligations, and compliance instability, especially for cross-border activity.

    The following table illustrates how a hypothetical utility token offering staking yield—a common configuration in DeFi ecosystems—would be classified across eleven jurisdictions, demonstrating the scale of divergence that analogical reasoning alone cannot resolve:

    CROSS-JURISDICTIONAL CLASSIFICATION: UTILITY TOKEN WITH STAKING YIELD
    Jurisdiction Primary Framework Likely Classification Key Regulatory Consequence
    EU MiCA (Reg 2023/1114)25 Utility token (if staking yield does not constitute profit expectation); may fall outside MiCA if classified as financial instrument under MiFID II CASP licensing required; white paper obligations; consumer disclosure
    United States Howey test (SEC)26 Investment contract if staking yield constitutes ‘profits from the efforts of others’; SEC enforcement posture aggressive (583 actions, $8.2B in FY2024)27 Securities registration required; broker-dealer/exchange registration; full SEC disclosure regime
    United Kingdom FSMA 2000, RAO28 Specified investment if staking yield creates rights analogous to collective investment scheme; otherwise ‘unregulated crypto-asset’ subject to financial promotion rules29 FCA authorisation; new Cryptoassets Regulations 2026 extending perimeter30
    Singapore PSA 201931 Digital payment token (DPT) if used as medium of exchange; may be capital markets product under SFA if securities-like MAS licensing; AML/CFT obligations; new custodial and transmission requirements (April 2024)
    Hong Kong AMLO Cap 61532 Virtual asset under VASP licensing; potential securities classification under SFO if governance-linked SFC VASP licence; dealing/custodian expansion expected 2025–2026
    Brazil Lei 14.478/202233 Ativo virtual (virtual asset) — broad functional definition; BCB as primary regulator for payment and service providers34 PSAV licensing; capital requirements R$10.8M–37.2M; segregation of client assets
    Australia ASIC INFO 22535 Financial product if substance-over-form analysis identifies managed investment scheme or derivative features; Treasury DAP regime pending36 AFSL requirement; bespoke DAP licensing by June 2026
    Japan PSA / FIEA transition37 Crypto-asset under PSA; proposed reclassification as financial instrument under FIEA (2027) Type 1 Financial Instruments Business standards; enhanced investor protection
    Canada CSA securities law38 May constitute a security or derivative depending on platform structure; established cryptoassets like BTC treated as commodity-like39 Platform registration with CIRO; Stablecoin Act pending
    Mexico Ley Fintech (2018)40 Activo virtual — representation of value registered electronically; only authorised ITFs may operate CNBV/Banxico authorisation; non-financial entities exempt from licensing but subject to AML
    Chile Ley 21.52141 Cryptoasset service under CMF oversight; AML/CFT obligations under Circular No. 62 (June 2025) CMF registration; exchange, custody, advisory, brokerage activities regulated

    The table exposes a structural reality that analogical regulation alone cannot resolve: the same arrangement triggers fundamentally different regulatory pathways depending on national legislative architecture and institutional mandate. A token issuer operating across the EU, the US, and Singapore simultaneously faces three incompatible classificatory regimes, each internally coherent but collectively incoherent. This is not a marginal problem—it is the central governance challenge of cross-border digital asset practice.

    The limits of analogical regulation are further exposed in transnational and cross-border contexts. Legal categories and tests developed within domestic systems reflect national policy choices, institutional histories, and enforcement cultures, and do not map neatly onto decentralised or semi-decentralised systems whose governance and value flows are distributed across multiple jurisdictions. Efforts to extend territorially grounded concepts of jurisdiction, control, or ‘place of activity’ to blockchain-based networks frequently encounter enforcement, coordination, and legitimacy challenges.

    Taxation illustrates the analogical limits with particular clarity. Tax systems are classification-intensive, distinguishing income and capital, services and supplies, ownership and use, or financial and non-financial assets. Applying these distinctions to tokens and digital asset arrangements without a prior governance analysis risks mischaracterising value creation, attribution, and control. The HMRC’s 2025 consultation on DeFi taxation acknowledged precisely this difficulty, noting that the characterisation of staking and lending returns as income or capital gains depends on governance arrangements that existing tax categories were not designed to capture.42 The OECD’s work on the tax challenges of the digital economy reinforces this point, emphasising that cross-border value creation in digital systems resists allocation through traditional nexus and attribution rules.43

    The core challenge in regulating blockchain, Web3, and digital assets is therefore not simply the choice of the ‘correct’ analogy, but the recognition that analogies alone cannot resolve governance complexity. Effective legal analysis requires a method capable of mapping how classifications interact across regulatory and tax layers, how institutional mandates and supervisory cultures shape outcomes, and how governance design influences liability, enforcement exposure, and fiscal treatment. This recognition provides the analytical justification for moving beyond analogy towards a structured, multi-layer governance approach, which the following sections develop as the basis for the Multi-Layer Governance Framework for Blockchain and Digital Assets (Carvalho-Ribas).


    Institutional Roles, Administrative Discretion, and Regulatory Outcomes

    Regulatory analysis of blockchain, Web3, and digital assets often concentrates on statutory provisions, regulatory instruments, and formal guidance. These sources are indispensable, but they do not, by themselves, explain how regulatory outcomes are produced in practice. In the digital asset domain, outcomes are shaped decisively by institutional roles, administrative discretion, and the interaction of authorities operating under fragmented and sometimes overlapping mandates.44

    Institutions do not regulate in the abstract. Regulatory authorities act within legally defined remits, organisational cultures, accountability structures, and practical constraints that influence how digital asset systems are interpreted, prioritised, and supervised. The following diagram maps the primary institutional actors across seven major jurisdictions, illustrating both the fragmentation of mandates and the resulting coordination challenges:

    PRIMARY INSTITUTIONAL ACTORS IN DIGITAL ASSET REGULATION
    EU
    ESMA — market conduct, CASP licensing under MiCA
    EBA — ART/EMT prudential supervision
    NCAs — domestic transposition and enforcement
    ECB — monetary policy, digital euro
    United States
    SEC — securities, investment contracts (Howey)
    CFTC — commodities, derivatives
    FinCEN — AML/BSA compliance
    IRS — tax treatment, CARF implementation
    United Kingdom
    FCA — market conduct, financial promotions, upcoming Cryptoassets Regulations 2026
    HMRC — taxation, DeFi classification
    BoE — systemic risk, digital pound
    Singapore
    MAS — integrated regulator: licensing (PSA), securities (SFA), AML/CFT, monetary policy
    Hong Kong
    SFC — VASP licensing, securities, futures
    HKMA — banking, stablecoins, systemic risk
    Brazil
    BCB — PSAV licensing, payment systems
    CVM — securities, investment funds
    RFB — tax treatment, reporting
    Australia
    ASIC — financial products, DAP licensing
    AUSTRAC — AML/CTF reporting
    ATO — CGT, income tax, GST treatment

    Administrative discretion plays a central role in regulatory outcomes, particularly in fast-evolving sectors. Legal rules in these areas are necessarily open-textured; concepts such as ‘control’, ‘influence’, ‘economic reality’, ‘arrangement’, ‘professional or business activity’, or ‘public offering’ require contextual interpretation in light of novel configurations. Supervisory authorities exercise discretion when deciding how these concepts apply, how strictly to enforce them, and where to allocate scarce enforcement resources. The SEC’s enforcement trajectory in the digital asset domain is illustrative: 583 total enforcement actions across all areas in FY2024, resulting in $8.2 billion in aggregate remedies (with crypto-asset cases constituting a significant proportion),45 demonstrate a supervisory posture of vigorous application of existing securities tests to novel arrangements, in contrast to the UK’s more phased approach through financial promotion rules and progressive perimeter extension.

    Cross-border digital asset structures amplify these dynamics. Authorities operating in different legal systems may reach divergent conclusions on similar facts, not because the underlying arrangements differ, but because institutional expectations, supervisory cultures, and enforcement practices do. In practice, regulatory risk is often less a function of whether a structure can be defended doctrinally in abstract terms, and more a function of how it is likely to be perceived, interrogated, and enforced by a particular authority at a particular time.

    International coordination mechanisms—from the FATF Travel Rule to the OECD’s Crypto-Asset Reporting Framework—seek convergence, yet compliance gaps persist: nearly one-third of jurisdictions surveyed by the FATF in 2025 had not yet legislated Travel Rule implementation, despite assessing VASPs as high-risk.

    The FATF’s sixth targeted update on virtual asset regulation, published in June 2025, confirmed that while jurisdictions with materially important VASP activity have made progress in developing AML/CFT frameworks, implementation of the Travel Rule—a cornerstone of cross-border information sharing—remains insufficient.46 Simultaneously, the OECD’s Crypto-Asset Reporting Framework (CARF), committed to by over 75 jurisdictions with first exchanges scheduled for 2027,47 and the EU’s transposition of CARF through the DAC8 Directive,48 are creating a new transparency infrastructure that will fundamentally alter the information environment within which digital asset systems operate. These convergence mechanisms do not, however, resolve underlying governance divergences—they add an additional compliance layer that itself requires governance-aware assessment.

    Comparative experience indicates that regulatory outcomes frequently turn on governance signals rather than on formal labels or purely technical features. Authorities consistently scrutinise who exercises decision-making power, who benefits economically, who bears operational and compliance risk, and who is capable, in practice, of intervening when systems fail or markets are disrupted.49 Where governance arrangements are opaque, fragmented, or misaligned with regulatory expectations—for example, where ‘decentralisation’ narratives obscure concentrated control or de facto managerial roles—classification tends to shift towards more intrusive regimes, regardless of nominal token characterisations or protocol claims.

    The interaction between institutions further complicates regulatory outcomes. Financial regulators may rely on—or implicitly adopt—tax authority determinations on asset character; tax authorities may defer to financial classification when determining the nature of income or gains; AML/CFT supervisors may impose due-diligence and reporting obligations that effectively redesign business models irrespective of a project’s status under financial regulation. Data protection and consumer protection bodies may intervene in ways that constrain governance or technical design, even where financial regulators see limited market-integrity concern. These interactions are rarely orchestrated through a single, unified framework; they typically emerge through informal cooperation, information sharing, supervisory colleges, and parallel or sequenced enforcement actions. Understanding these dynamics is essential for anticipating how digital asset systems will be assessed over time and across legal orders.

    This institutional reality underscores the limits of purely rule-based or checklist-driven approaches to digital asset regulation. Legal certainty in this domain does not arise solely from formal compliance with isolated regulatory requirements, but from coherence between legal classification, governance design, institutional expectations, and administrative practice across authorities and jurisdictions. This insight provides the final contextual foundation for the introduction of the Multi-Layer Governance Framework for Blockchain and Digital Assets (Carvalho-Ribas), which is expressly designed to render these institutional dynamics analytically visible and professionally actionable.


    The Multi-Layer Governance Framework for Blockchain and Digital Assets (Carvalho-Ribas)

    The analytical challenges identified in the preceding sections—fragmented classification, the limits of analogical regulation, and institution-driven regulatory outcomes—require a framework capable of linking legal doctrine, administrative practice, and system design without collapsing one dimension into another. The Multi-Layer Governance Framework for Blockchain and Digital Assets (Carvalho-Ribas) is developed precisely for this purpose. It is not a compliance checklist, a technical modelling tool, or a substitute for regulation; it is an interpretative framework designed to render governance dynamics visible and assessable across jurisdictions and regulatory domains.50

    The framework proceeds from a core premise grounded in applied cross-border practice: regulatory and fiscal outcomes in digital asset systems are determined less by how tokens are described in formal documentation and more by how value, control, risk, and decision-making authority are distributed and exercised across analytically distinct layers. These layers are conceptually separable, institutionally relevant, and legally consequential, yet they are frequently assessed in isolation—a fragmentation that governance and financial regulation scholarship has shown to be a source of regulatory blind spots in complex infrastructures.51

    MULTI-LAYER GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK FOR BLOCKCHAIN AND DIGITAL ASSETS (CARVALHO-RIBAS)
    CROSS-BORDER & JURISDICTIONAL
    Conflict of laws, supervisory reach, tax nexus, treaty interaction, international cooperation (FATF, OECD CARF, DAC8). Governs where and how law asserts itself across distributed networks.
    TECHNICAL & FUNCTIONAL
    Protocol design, consensus mechanisms, custody, oracles, bridges. Constrains or enables governance; shapes legal and institutional possibilities.
    ECONOMIC & VALUE-FLOW
    Token issuance, vesting, staking, treasury flows, revenue models. Source of value, beneficial ownership, attribution, transfer pricing.
    GOVERNANCE & DECISION-MAKING
    Decision-making power, control mechanisms, veto rights, accountability. Formal (boards, DAOs) and informal (developer dominance, treasury control).
    INSTITUTIONAL & ADMINISTRATIVE
    Mandates, enforcement powers, coordination. ESMA, SEC, FCA, MAS, SFC, BCB — supervisory culture, discretion, resource constraints.
    LEGAL-NORMATIVE
    Statutes, regulations, delegated acts, guidance, case law. MiCA, FSMA, Howey, PSA, AMLO, Lei 14.478 — the formal rules governing digital asset systems.

    The Legal-Normative Layer

    The legal-normative layer concerns the corpus of formal rules applicable to a digital asset system, including statutes, regulations, delegated acts, administrative guidance, and case law. It encompasses financial markets law (MiCA, MiFID II, FSMA, the Securities Act 1933, PSA 2019), tax law (including the OECD’s CARF framework52 and DAC853), AML/CFT rules (FATF Recommendations, national transpositions), consumer and data protection, competition law, and corporate or organisational law. Crucially, this layer does not operate autonomously; its practical meaning emerges through interpretation and application by competent authorities. In operational terms, the legal-normative layer answers the question: Which legal regimes are potentially engaged, and on what normative basis?

    The Institutional and Administrative Layer

    The institutional and administrative layer captures how legal norms are translated into practice by public authorities and related bodies. It includes the mandates, enforcement powers, and coordination mechanisms of supervisory authorities, as well as administrative discretion, supervisory culture, and resource constraints. Experience across EU, UK, and non-European jurisdictions indicates that this layer often explains why identical factual arrangements are treated differently in practice—a function of institutional mandate and enforcement culture rather than doctrinal disagreement.54 Analytically, it answers: Which authorities will assess the system, how do they understand their remit, and how are they likely to exercise their discretion?

    The Governance and Decision-Making Layer

    The governance and decision-making layer concerns the allocation of decision-making power, control mechanisms, veto rights, and accountability structures within a digital asset system. It covers both formal governance organs (boards, foundations, DAOs, committees) and informal or de facto control (developer dominance, treasury control, upgrade authority, off-chain coordination). In regulatory practice, this layer is often decisive: authorities consistently prioritise governance realities over decentralisation narratives or token labels.55 Functionally, it answers: Who can decide, who can intervene, and who ultimately bears responsibility when systems fail or misconduct occurs?

    The Economic and Value-Flow Layer

    The economic and value-flow layer addresses how value is created, captured, transferred, and distributed within the system. It includes token issuance and allocation, vesting, staking and reward mechanisms, treasury flows, revenue generation models, and incentive structures—elements increasingly central to tax, accounting, and prudential assessments.56 From a legal and fiscal perspective, this layer is critical for assessing economic substance, attribution of income and gains, transfer-pricing or nexus questions, and the allocation of risk and return. It answers: Where does value arise, who benefits, and how are economic outcomes structured over time?

    The Technical and Functional Layer

    The technical and functional layer concerns the architecture of the system: protocol and smart-contract design, consensus mechanisms, custody and wallet solutions, interfaces, bridges, oracles, and scalability layers. This layer is not examined for its own sake, but for how it constrains or enables governance, shapes value flows, and conditions legal and institutional possibilities.57 In applied practice, a significant part of professional value consists in translating this layer into legal and institutional terms. It answers: What does the system technically allow or prevent actors from doing, and how does that map onto concepts such as control, reliance, or risk?

    The Cross-Border and Jurisdictional Layer

    Digital asset systems are intrinsically transnational, with activities, value flows, governance functions, and enforcement exposure distributed across multiple jurisdictions. The cross-border and jurisdictional layer addresses how conflict-of-laws issues, supervisory reach, tax nexus, treaty interaction, and international cooperation mechanisms shape the regulatory and fiscal perimeter of a given system. The OECD’s CARF framework—now committed to by over 75 jurisdictions for the 2026 reporting period58—and the FATF Travel Rule59 represent significant international coordination mechanisms operating at this layer, though neither resolves the underlying governance divergences documented in Sections III and IV. It answers: Where and how does law assert itself, and with what practical effect on actors and arrangements embedded in a distributed network?


    The strength of the Multi-Layer Governance Framework for Blockchain and Digital Assets (Carvalho-Ribas) does not lie in identifying these layers individually—each dimension is, in isolation, familiar to experienced professionals—but in systematically analysing their interaction. Regulatory, supervisory, and fiscal risk typically arises where layers are misaligned: where governance power does not correspond to legal responsibility, where economic substance diverges from formal classification, where institutional mandates leave critical risks unaddressed, or where technical design obscures institutional accountability.

    The framework is deliberately system-neutral. It can be applied to permissionless and permissioned systems, centralised and decentralised structures, and to both early-stage projects and mature ecosystems.60 It does not prescribe outcomes. Instead, it offers a disciplined method for diagnosing how different authorities are likely to interpret a given structure, where conflicts or gaps between regimes may arise, and where governance redesign may be required to achieve legal and institutional coherence.

    By making governance relationships and cross-layer interactions explicit, the framework enables professionals and authorities to move beyond reactive, analogy-driven classification towards anticipatory regulatory reasoning. It also provides a common analytical language across legal, tax, supervisory, and policy domains—an essential condition for coherent cross-border governance of blockchain and digital asset systems. The framework will be operationalised and tested through comparative analysis, diagnostic application, and empirical evidence in subsequent papers within this series.


    Blockchain, Web3 and Digital Assets as a High-Value Domain for Global Practice

    Blockchain, Web3, and digital assets constitute a high-value domain for global legal, regulatory, and tax practice not because of market expansion or technological novelty, but because they concentrate multiple sources of legal and institutional complexity within a single operational field. This concentration generates sustained demand for advanced professional judgment, structured institutional engagement, and cross-border coordination.

    From a professional practice perspective, value in this domain arises at the intersection of legal uncertainty, institutional discretion, and multi-jurisdictional exposure. Digital asset systems routinely operate across several legal orders while engaging regulatory regimes that were not designed to interoperate seamlessly, including financial regulation, tax law, AML/CFT frameworks, data protection, and corporate and securities governance. These regimes frequently converge within single structures without a clear hierarchy or coordinating principle, meaning that practitioners must provide not only doctrinal interpretation but also translation of risk and expectations among institutions with differing mandates and supervisory cultures.

    The emerging international tax transparency infrastructure reinforces this dynamic. The OECD’s CARF framework, with over 75 committed jurisdictions and first reporting commencing in 2026,61 will create an unprecedented volume of cross-border information exchange relating to crypto-asset transactions. The EU’s DAC8 Directive requires Member State transposition by 31 December 2025,62 while further implementation waves will bring Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, and Singapore into the CARF exchange network by 2028. This new reporting architecture does not simplify compliance; it multiplies the governance dimensions that practitioners must assess, including jurisdictional nexus, reporting entity obligations, and the interaction between CARF classifications and domestic tax treatment.

    Taxation provides a particularly clear illustration of the domain’s complexity. The absence of harmonised international rules for digital asset taxation means that questions of value creation, attribution, and timing remain contested across jurisdictions. The HMRC’s 2025 consultation on DeFi taxation—specifically addressing whether staking and lending returns constitute income or capital gains63—exemplifies the unresolved classification challenges that practitioners face in every major jurisdiction. Cross-border token flows, staking rewards, protocol-level revenues, and treasury management raise complex issues of source, residence, beneficial ownership, characterisation of income, and treaty application.64

    The high-value character of this area is reinforced by the centrality of governance design to regulatory and fiscal outcomes. In contrast to many traditional regulated sectors, blockchain-based systems often embed governance within the product itself: token rights, treasury rules, upgrade mechanisms, and participation thresholds are designed as part of the protocol or ecosystem. Advisers who understand how governance architecture translates into regulatory and tax consequences are therefore able to influence outcomes ex ante, rather than merely reacting to ex post enforcement.

    Digital assets also function as a stress test for legal systems more broadly. Questions arising in this domain—regarding decentralisation, responsibility in the absence of traditional intermediaries, cross-border enforcement, and the effectiveness of territorially grounded rules in distributed networks—mirror issues that increasingly appear in other areas of economic governance, from platform regulation to AI-driven infrastructures.65 The Multi-Layer Governance Framework for Blockchain and Digital Assets (Carvalho-Ribas) provides a structured foundation for such work by aligning doctrinal analysis with the practical realities of cross-border regulation and supervision, and by offering a common governance-centred language that can be used across legal, tax, supervisory, and policy settings.

    Knowledge and Practice Continuity

    This paper forms part of a structured doctrinal system dedicated to the legal, regulatory, and governance analysis of blockchain, Web3, and digital asset systems across multiple jurisdictions and institutional settings. It is not conceived as a standalone treatment, but as one articulated component within a cumulative research programme combining comparative regulatory analysis with applied professional practice in cross-border digital asset, financial, and fiscal contexts.

    The present paper constitutes one element within an integrated authority structure composed of four interlinked components: Written Papers (doctrinal foundation) → Professional Training (applied interpretative capacity) → Advanced Course (cross-context framework application) → Implementation Cohort (operational execution under real constraints).

    FUNCTION MODE OUTPUT AUDIENCE
    Written Paper (DA-01) Establishes legal ontology of blockchain, Web3, and digital assets. Diagnoses governance complexity and structural limits of analogical regulation. Introduces the Multi-Layer Governance Framework (Carvalho-Ribas). Governance-grade conceptual foundation: definitions, diagnostic frameworks, six-layer analytical model. Common reference vocabulary for cross-jurisdictional digital asset analysis. International tax lawyers, financial regulators, supervisory authorities, policymakers, senior compliance officers, digital asset platform counsel, institutional investors.
    Professional Training Applied governance-oriented reasoning using the Multi-Layer Framework. Structured issue identification across all six layers. Decision-path analysis under regulatory uncertainty and institutional fragmentation. Interpretative capacity: ability to diagnose classification risk, map institutional dynamics, and construct governance-coherent assessments across jurisdictions. Practising lawyers, tax advisers, compliance officers, DeFi operators, in-house counsel at digital asset platforms, regulatory analysts.
    Advanced Course Cross-context application of the Multi-Layer Framework to complex, multi-jurisdictional digital asset structures. Integration of legal classification, administrative practice, governance design, and economic substance. Strategic assessment capacity: governance-consistent structuring, anticipatory regulatory reasoning, institutional-engagement methodology. Senior advisers, partners, regulatory leads, government policy teams, institutional governance officers, foundation directors.
    Implementation Cohort Live execution of governance-grade digital asset analysis under real regulatory constraints. Direct engagement with supervisory authorities and cross-border coordination. Operational authority: governance-integrated advisory mandates, authority-facing submissions, cross-jurisdictional regulatory risk management. Experienced cross-border practitioners, senior regulators, institutional actors, ministry officials, foundation governance leads.

    Conclusions

    The analysis developed in this paper demonstrates that blockchain, Web3, and digital assets cannot be understood or regulated effectively through isolated legal classifications, purely technical descriptions, or sector-specific analogies. Persistent uncertainty across jurisdictions reflects not an absence of regulation, but a structural misalignment between legal doctrine, institutional practice, and the governance realities of digital asset systems. The comparative evidence assembled across eleven jurisdictions—from the EU’s bespoke MiCA framework to Brazil’s Lei 14.478, from the SEC’s Howey-derived enforcement posture to Japan’s proposed transition from payment-services to financial-instruments regulation—confirms that analogical reasoning alone cannot resolve governance complexity in systems that operate simultaneously across multiple legal, economic, and institutional layers.

    By examining the limits of analogical regulation, the role of administrative discretion, and the interaction between institutions operating under fragmented mandates, this paper has shown that regulatory outcomes in the digital asset domain are produced through layered processes of interpretation, prioritisation, and enforcement. Legal norms acquire operational meaning only when applied by institutions embedded in particular organisational, political, and supervisory contexts. Analyses that abstract from this institutional dimension tend to be formally coherent yet operationally fragile, especially in cross-border settings where multiple authorities assert overlapping claims.

    The introduction of the Multi-Layer Governance Framework for Blockchain and Digital Assets (Carvalho-Ribas) responds directly to this challenge. The framework provides a structured method for analysing how legal rules, governance arrangements, economic value flows, technical architecture, and jurisdictional reach interact in practice. By making these interactions explicit, the framework supports more reliable assessment of regulatory exposure, likely institutional responses, and the long-term sustainability and resilience of digital asset systems.

    The emerging international coordination infrastructure—the OECD’s CARF with over 75 committed jurisdictions, the EU’s DAC8, the FATF’s revised Recommendation 16—adds urgency to this governance-centred approach. These mechanisms create new transparency obligations that cross-cut existing national classifications, further exposing the inadequacy of single-layer regulatory analysis. Practitioners, regulators, and policymakers who lack a framework for assessing how these coordination mechanisms interact with domestic governance arrangements will face increasing exposure to compliance failures, enforcement risk, and strategic misjudgment.

    More broadly, blockchain and digital assets expose foundational tensions in contemporary legal systems, including the limits of territorially anchored regulation, the distribution of responsibility in decentralised environments, and the relationship between formal rules and emergent governance practices. By situating digital assets within a governance-grade analytical framework, this paper establishes a foundation for consistent, comparative, and institutionally informed legal analysis that can support continuity across jurisdictions and regulatory domains, foster dialogue between professional and supervisory communities, and inform the development of regulatory approaches capable of evolving alongside the systems they seek to govern.


    Frequently asked

    What is the Multi-Layer Governance Framework (MLGF)?

    The MLGF (Carvalho-Ribas) is an interpretative framework — not a compliance checklist or technical modelling tool — designed to render governance dynamics visible and assessable across jurisdictions and regulatory domains. Its core premise, grounded in cross-border practice, is that regulatory and fiscal outcomes in digital-asset systems are determined less by how a token is described in formal documentation and more by how value, control, risk, and decision-making authority are distributed and exercised across analytically distinct layers.

    What are the six layers of the MLGF?

    Legal-Normative (statutes, regulations, delegated acts, guidance, case law); Institutional & Administrative (mandates, enforcement powers, supervisory culture and discretion); Governance & Decision-Making (control mechanisms, veto rights, accountability — formal and informal); Economic & Value-Flow (issuance, vesting, staking, treasury flows, beneficial ownership); Technical & Functional (protocol design, consensus, custody, oracles, bridges); and Cross-Border & Jurisdictional (conflict of laws, supervisory reach, tax nexus, treaty interaction, FATF/OECD CARF/DAC8). Each layer is conceptually separable yet legally consequential, and assessing any one in isolation is what produces regulatory blind spots.

    Why does the paper argue that analogical regulation fails for digital assets?

    Because classifying a token by reference to a single pre-existing category — security, commodity, payment instrument, e-money, or utility — captures only a fragment of a system that combines economic coordination, governance participation, access control, and value representation at once. A single token can simultaneously be treated as a financial instrument for market conduct, a commodity under derivatives rules, a means of payment for AML, and an intangible asset for tax — each defensible in its own silo, yet together producing regulatory incoherence and compliance instability, especially across borders.

    If these systems are really governance arrangements, why do regulators keep misclassifying them?

    Because the difficulty is a governance problem, not a technical one. Regulatory outcomes are shaped by institutional roles, administrative discretion, and authorities acting under fragmented and sometimes overlapping mandates — the paper maps the primary institutional actors across seven major jurisdictions. Supervisory assessments repeatedly return to questions of effective control, influence, economic benefit, and risk exposure, which technical description alone cannot resolve.

    What is the evidentiary basis, and is this legal advice?

    It is a comparative introductory legal and institutional analysis drawing on regulatory regimes and supervisory practice across eleven jurisdictions — including the EU's MiCA, the UK, the US Howey posture, Brazil, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Australia — alongside the emerging international transparency infrastructure (the OECD's CARF, with over 75 committed jurisdictions and first reporting in 2026, and the EU's DAC8). It is authority research and general information, expressly not a compliance guide, investment advice, or jurisdiction-specific tax planning.

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    Endnotes

    1 The definitions in Section I are functional and governance-oriented. They do not reproduce verbatim any single regulatory authority’s statutory definitions but are constructed to support governance-grade legal analysis across jurisdictions. Where official legal definitions exist (e.g., MiCA Art 3, FSMA RAO, PSA 2019 s 2), they are referenced alongside the working definitions adopted here. ↩
    2 National Institute of Standards and Technology, ‘Blockchain’ (NIST Glossary, NISTIR 8202 et seq, last updated 2025). ↩
    3 See, inter alia, OECD, Blockchain at the Frontier: Impacts and Issues in Cross-Border Co-operation and Global Governance (OECD Publishing 2022); WIPO, Blockchain Technologies and IP Ecosystems: A WIPO White Paper (WIPO 2022). ↩
    4 Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2023 on markets in crypto-assets (MiCA), Art 3(1)(5), defining ‘crypto-asset’ as ‘a digital representation of a value or of a right that is able to be transferred and stored electronically, using distributed ledger technology or similar technology’. ↩
    5 This approach is consistent with the substance-over-form analysis adopted by ESMA, the FCA, and ASIC. See ESMA, ‘Advice on Initial Coin Offerings and Crypto-Assets’ (ESMA50-157-1391, 9 January 2019); ASIC, Information Sheet 225 (INFO 225), ‘Crypto-assets: When they are financial products’ (December 2024). ↩
    6 On governance as a central analytical dimension in blockchain systems, see Van Pelt R, Jansen S, Baars D, Overbeek S, ‘Defining Blockchain Governance: A Framework for Analysis and Comparison’, Information Systems Management 38(1) 21 (2021); Reijers S and others, ‘A System-Based View of Blockchain Governance’ (2023) Information and Software Technology. ↩
    7 On the distinction between technical and governance failures in blockchain regulation, see Van Pelt R, Jansen S, Baars D, Overbeek S, ‘Defining Blockchain Governance: A Framework for Analysis and Comparison’, Information Systems Management 38(1) 21 (2021). ↩
    8 Zachariadis M, Hileman G, Scott SV, ‘Governance and Control in Distributed Ledgers: Understanding the Challenges Facing Blockchain Technology in Financial Services’ (2019). ↩
    9 Federal Reserve Board, ‘Governance of Permissionless Blockchain Networks’ (FEDS Notes, 9 February 2024). ↩
    10 Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 (MiCA). MiCA implementation proceeded in two phases: Asset-Referenced Tokens (ART) and E-Money Tokens (EMT) provisions from 30 June 2024 (Phase 1); Crypto-Asset Service Provider (CASP) licensing from 30 December 2024 (Phase 2); transitional grandfathering measures run until 30 June 2026. ↩
    11 SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946), establishing the ‘investment contract’ test: an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others. ↩
    12 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (UK), s 22 and the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001, SI 2001/544. ↩
    13 FCA Policy Statement PS23/6, ‘Financial promotion rules for cryptoassets’ (June 2023), bringing qualifying cryptoasset promotions within the scope of s 21 FSMA, effective 8 October 2023. ↩
    14 The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Cryptoassets) Regulations 2026, made February 2026, extending the FCA regulatory perimeter to cover cryptoasset activities beyond financial promotions. ↩
    15 Payment Services Act 2019 (Singapore), as amended by the Payment Services (Amendment) Act 2021 (commenced 4 April 2024) (effective April 2024), expanding the definition of ‘digital payment token service’ to include custodial services and DPT transmission. ↩
    16 Securities and Futures Commission (Hong Kong), VASP licensing regime under the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Ordinance (AMLO), Cap 615. Nine platforms licensed by February 2025; consultation on expansion to dealing and custodian services issued June 2025. ↩
    17 Lei 14.478 de 21 de dezembro de 2022 (Brazil), establishing the legal framework for the provision of virtual asset services and regulating virtual asset service providers (prestadores de serviços de ativos virtuais — PSAVs). ↩
    18 Banco Central do Brasil, Resoluções BCB 519, 520, and 521 (November 2025), implementing the licensing, capital adequacy, and operational requirements for virtual asset service providers under Lei 14.478/2022. ↩
    19 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Information Sheet 225 (INFO 225), ‘Crypto-assets: When they are financial products’ (December 2024). ↩
    20 Japan Financial Services Agency, proposal to transition crypto-asset regulation from the Payment Services Act to the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act (September 2025), with implementation expected 2027. ↩
    21 Ostrom E, ‘Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems’, American Economic Review 100(3) 641 (2010). ↩
    22 Internet Policy Review, ‘Blockchain Governance’ (Glossary, 19 April 2021). ↩
    23 European Securities and Markets Authority, ‘Advice on Initial Coin Offerings and Crypto-Assets’ (ESMA50-157-1391, 9 January 2019), para 4, identifying the limitations of existing EU financial legislation in capturing crypto-asset characteristics. ↩
    24 OECD, Why Decentralised Finance Matters and the Policy Implications (OECD Publishing 2022). ↩
    25 Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 (MiCA), Title II (utility tokens), Title III (ARTs), Title IV (EMTs). ↩
    26 SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). See also SEC Staff, ‘Framework for “Investment Contract” Analysis of Digital Assets’ (April 2019). ↩
    27 SEC Chair Paul Atkins, ‘Project Crypto’ (2025), proposing a four-category token taxonomy (digital commodities/network tokens, digital collectibles, digital tools, tokenised securities). The SEC Division of Enforcement reported 583 total enforcement actions in FY2024 across all areas, resulting in $8.2 billion in aggregate remedies, with crypto-asset-related cases constituting a significant proportion. ↩
    28 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (UK), s 22 and RAO. ↩
    29 FCA PS23/6, effective 8 October 2023. ↩
    30 The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Cryptoassets) Regulations 2026, made February 2026. ↩
    31 Payment Services Act 2019 (Singapore), as amended by the Payment Services (Amendment) Act 2021 (commenced 4 April 2024). ↩
    32 AMLO Cap 615 (Hong Kong), VASP licensing provisions. ↩
    33 Lei 14.478/2022 (Brazil). ↩
    34 Resoluções BCB 519, 520, 521 (November 2025). Capital requirements range from R$10.8M to R$37.2M depending on service category. ↩
    35 ASIC INFO 225 (December 2024). ↩
    36 Australian Treasury, ‘Digital Asset Platform (DAP) Licensing Exposure Draft’ (September 2025), proposing a bespoke licensing regime under the Corporations Act 2001, with AFSL applications required by June 2026. ↩
    37 Japan FSA, proposal to transition crypto-asset regulation from the Payment Services Act to the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act (September 2025). ↩
    38 Canadian Securities Administrators, Staff Notice 21-327, ‘Guidance on the Application of Securities Legislation to Entities Facilitating the Trading of Crypto Assets’, and subsequent CSA/CIRO guidance on platform registration. ↩
    39 Government of Canada, Budget 2025 Implementation Act, No. 1, containing the draft Stablecoin Act. CSA/CIRO have acknowledged that established virtual currencies functioning as means of exchange (e.g., BTC) are not currently securities and have commodity-like characteristics. ↩
    40 Ley para Regular las Instituciones de Tecnología Financiera (Mexico, 2018), Art 30, defining ‘activos virtuales’. CNBV and Banxico exercise joint regulatory oversight. ↩
    41 Chile, Ley 21.521 (Ley Fintech), enacted 4 January 2023, effective 3 February 2023. CMF Circular No. 62 (March 2025) imposing AML/CFT obligations on cryptoasset service providers, effective June 2025. ↩
    42 HMRC, ‘The Taxation of Decentralised Finance (DeFi) Involving the Lending and Staking of Cryptoassets: Summary of Responses’ (2025). ↩
    43 OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy (OECD Publishing 2014). ↩
    44 On institutional fragmentation in financial regulation, see Seira A, Jeffrey A, Watsky Cy, Richard A, ‘Governance of Permissionless Blockchain Networks’, FEDS Notes, Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2024). ↩
    45 SEC Division of Enforcement, annual report data FY2024. SEC Chair Paul Atkins’ ‘Project Crypto’ (2025) proposed a four-category token taxonomy (digital commodities/network tokens, digital collectibles, digital tools, tokenised securities) intended to bring greater regulatory clarity. ↩
    46 FATF, ‘6th Targeted Update on Implementation of the FATF Standards on Virtual Assets and VASPs’ (June 2025). Nearly one-third of responding jurisdictions had not yet legislated Travel Rule implementation. See also FATF, ‘Updated Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach to Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset Service Providers’ (October 2021); Recommendation 16 (Travel Rule). ↩
    47 OECD, ‘Crypto-Asset Reporting Framework and Amendments to the Common Reporting Standard’ (2023). Initially committed to by 48 jurisdictions in November 2023, the framework had expanded to approximately 75 committed jurisdictions by late 2025, with first reporting year 2026. First exchanges scheduled for 2027 (EU, UK, Brazil, Cayman Islands); second wave 2028 (Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Singapore); US scheduled 2029. ↩
    48 Council Directive (EU) 2023/2226 (DAC8), requiring EU Member States to transpose CARF provisions by 31 December 2025, with first reporting year 2026. ↩
    49 UK Jurisdiction Taskforce, ‘Legal Statement on Cryptoassets and Smart Contracts’ (November 2019), confirming that English law treats cryptoassets as property capable of being owned and transferred, a determination that itself depends on governance analysis of the underlying system. ↩
    50 The framework draws on, and is designed to complement, multi-layer governance approaches developed in political science and regulatory studies, notably Ostrom’s work on polycentric governance: Ostrom E, ‘Beyond Markets and States’ (2010), and scholarship on blockchain-specific governance: Van Pelt R et al (2021); Reijers S et al (2023). ↩
    51 Van Pelt R and others (2021); OECD, Blockchain at the Frontier (2022). ↩
    52 OECD CARF (2023). ↩
    53 Council Directive (EU) 2023/2226 (DAC8). ↩
    54 See the comparative treatment of identical staking arrangements across the eleven jurisdictions examined in Section III. ↩
    55 Federal Reserve Board, FEDS Notes (2024); Van Pelt R et al (2021). ↩
    56 HMRC DeFi consultation (2025); OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy (2014). ↩
    57 WIPO, Blockchain Technologies and IP Ecosystems: A WIPO White Paper (WIPO 2022). ↩
    58 OECD CARF (2023); initially 48 jurisdictions (November 2023), expanded to approximately 75 by late 2025. ↩
    59 FATF Recommendation 16 (Travel Rule); FATF 6th Targeted Update (June 2025). ↩
    60 On system-neutral governance frameworks for blockchain, see Reijers S and others, ‘A System-Based View of Blockchain Governance’ (2023) Information and Software Technology. ↩
    61 OECD CARF (2023). ↩
    62 DAC8, transposition deadline 31 December 2025. ↩
    63 HMRC DeFi consultation (2025). ↩
    64 OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy (2014). ↩
    65 OECD, Blockchain at the Frontier: Impacts and Issues in Cross-Border Co-operation and Global Governance (OECD Publishing 2022). ↩

    References

    Universal DA Core Bibliography
    National Institute of Standards and Technology, ‘Blockchain’ (NIST Glossary, NISTIR 8202 et seq, last updated 2025).
    EU Blockchain Observatory and Forum.
    EU European Securities and Markets Authority, ‘Advice on Initial Coin Offerings and Crypto-Assets’ (ESMA50-157-1391, 9 January 2019).
    EU European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation on Markets in Crypto-assets (MiCA)’ COM(2020) 593 final.
    EU Regulation 2023/1114 on Markets in Crypto-assets (MiCA).
    Federal Reserve Board, ‘Governance of Permissionless Blockchain Networks’ (FEDS Notes, 9 February 2024).
    Internet Policy Review, ‘Blockchain Governance’ (Glossary, 19 April 2021).
    OECD, Blockchain at the Frontier: Impacts and Issues in Cross-Border Co-operation and Global Governance (OECD Publishing 2022).
    OECD, Why Decentralised Finance Matters and the Policy Implications (OECD Publishing 2022).
    OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy (OECD Publishing 2014).
    Ostrom E, ‘Collective Action Theory’ in C Boix and S Stokes (eds), Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics (OUP 2007).
    Ostrom E, ‘Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems’, American Economic Review 100(3) 641 (2010).
    Reijers S and others, ‘A System-Based View of Blockchain Governance’ (2023) Information and Software Technology.
    Van Pelt R, Jansen S, Baars D, Overbeek S, ‘Defining Blockchain Governance: A Framework for Analysis and Comparison’, Information Systems Management 38(1) 21 (2021).
    Seira A, Jeffrey A, Watsky Cy, Richard A, ‘Governance of Permissionless Blockchain Networks’, FEDS Notes (2024).
    UK Jurisdiction Taskforce, Legal Statement on Cryptoassets and Smart Contracts (November 2019).
    UK HMRC, ‘The Taxation of Decentralised Finance (DeFi) Involving The Lending and Staking of Cryptoassets’, Summary of Responses (2025).
    Van Pelt R, Jansen S, Baars D, Overbeek S, ‘Defining Blockchain Governance: A Framework for Analysis and Comparison’, Info. Systems Man. 38(1) 21 (2021).
    WIPO, Blockchain Technologies and IP Ecosystems: A WIPO White Paper (WIPO 2022).
    Zachariadis M, Hileman G, Scott SV, ‘Governance and Control in Distributed Ledgers’ (2019).
    Paper-Specific References (DA-01)
    SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
    Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (UK), s 22; Regulated Activities Order 2001, SI 2001/544.
    FCA Policy Statement PS23/6, ‘Financial promotion rules for cryptoassets’ (June 2023).
    The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Cryptoassets) Regulations 2026.
    Payment Services Act 2019 (Singapore), as amended by the Payment Services (Amendment) Act 2021 (commenced 4 April 2024).
    Securities and Futures Commission (Hong Kong), VASP licensing regime under AMLO Cap 615.
    Lei 14.478 de 21 de dezembro de 2022 (Brazil).
    Banco Central do Brasil, Resoluções BCB 519, 520, 521 (November 2025).
    Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Information Sheet 225 (INFO 225), ‘Crypto-assets: When they are financial products’ (December 2024).
    Australian Treasury, ‘Digital Asset Platform (DAP) Licensing Exposure Draft’ (September 2025).
    Japan Financial Services Agency, PSA to FIEA transition proposal (September 2025).
    Canadian Securities Administrators, Staff Notice 21-327.
    Government of Canada, Budget 2025 Implementation Act, No. 1 (draft Stablecoin Act).
    Ley para Regular las Instituciones de Tecnología Financiera (Mexico, 2018).
    Chile, Ley 21.521 (Ley Fintech, 2023); CMF Circular No. 62 (March 2025).
    OECD, ‘Crypto-Asset Reporting Framework and Amendments to the Common Reporting Standard’ (2023).
    Council Directive (EU) 2023/2226 (DAC8).
    FATF, ‘Updated Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach to Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset Service Providers’ (October 2021).
    FATF, ‘6th Targeted Update on Implementation of the FATF Standards on Virtual Assets and VASPs’ (June 2025).
    SEC Chair Paul Atkins, ‘Project Crypto’ (2025).
    ECR Authority Stack
    Carvalho-Ribas, E., ‘Blockchain, Web3 and Digital Assets: Legal Ontology, Governance Complexity, and the Limits of Analogical Regulation’. DA-01. ECR-Digital Assets Series. Published through MoroAK Professional Knowledge Infrastructure, 2026. Available at moroak.com.

    Carvalho-Ribas, Evelyse. ‘Blockchain, Web3 and Digital Assets: Legal Ontology, Governance Complexity, and the Limits of Analogical Regulation’. DA-01. ECR-Digital Assets Series. Published through MoroAK Professional Knowledge Infrastructure, 2026. Available at moroak.com.

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    Evelyse Carvalho-Ribas · Blockchain, Web3 and Digital Assets: Legal Ontology, Governance Complexity, and the Limits of Analogical Regulation · DA-01 · © 2026

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