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    DA-02 - The Structural Architecture of Blockchain and Web3 Systems Layered Analysis for Legal and Regulatory Classification

    Evelyse Carvalho-Ribas6 Aug 2026
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    Evelyse Carvalho-Ribas
    DA-02 · DIGITAL ASSETS & TOKENISATION

    The Structural Architecture of Blockchain and Web3 Systems: Layered Analysis for Legal and Regulatory Classification

    Structural Layers · Legal Classification · Multi-Layer Governance Framework

    Series
    ECR-Digital Assets Series · DA
    Author
    Evelyse Carvalho-Ribas
    Credentials
    PhD in Law, University of Leeds, School of Law, 2026
    Practice
    20+ years across EU · UK · Australia · Americas · Asia-Pacific
    Published Through
    MoroAK Professional Knowledge Infrastructure
    Year
    2026

    Evelyse Carvalho-Ribas

    PRIMARY AUTHORITY DOMAIN
    Cultural-creative tax incentives · Structural fiscal access constraints (SFACs) · Cross-border cultural-fiscal governance · National frameworks · EU internal market law · UNESCO 2005 Convention · Bilateral treaty practice.
    SECONDARY DOMAIN
    Digital and tokenised assets · National financial regulation · Supranational supervisory frameworks · International tax coordination · Technological architecture · Governance design.
    DOMAIN SYNERGIES
    Both domains are unified by the same structural problem: complexity at the intersection of national, supranational, and international legal orders — where regulatory fragmentation, administrative opacity, and institutional misalignment prevent legitimate access to legal, fiscal, and financial frameworks. In fiscal governance, this manifests as SFACs blocking cross-border access to tax incentives. In digital assets, it manifests as the absence of a coherent governance-grade framework linking legal classification, regulatory supervision, technical design, and cross-border value flows. Evelyse Carvalho-Ribas' analytical methodology — multi-relational, governance-first, jurisdiction-aware — applies with equal rigour across both.
    UNIQUE FRAMEWORK CONTRIBUTION
    Originator of the SFAC concept (Structural Fiscal Access Constraints) — the first taxonomised framework for diagnosing why cross-border tax incentives systematically fail. Creator of the CCTIM (Cultural-Creative Tax Incentive Model), a soft-governance reform architecture reducing SFACs without requiring legal harmonisation or fiscal sovereignty surrender. Creator of a governance-grade interpretative framework for digital and tokenised assets capable of linking legal classification, regulatory supervision, technical design, and cross-border value flows within a coherent analytical model.
    ACADEMIC CREDENTIAL
    PhD in Law, University of Leeds, School of Law, 2026. Thesis: “Toward a Shared Coordinate Framework for Cultural-Creative Tax Incentives.” Examined across national, bilateral, EU, and UNESCO legal frameworks. 25+ jurisdictions analysed. LLM in International Commercial and Business Law, University of East Anglia, School of Law, 2007.
    PROFESSIONAL CREDENTIAL
    Qualified Lawyer in Brazil and Portugal. Foreign Lawyer in England and Wales. 20+ year career built on the legal, tax, and regulatory architecture of two core pillars: tax incentives and digital assets & tokenisation. Working directly with national authorities, regulators, and institutions to surface legal and administrative blind spots and address misalignment between domestic regimes and international obligations. With international tax lawyers and advisers, accountants and financial advisers, policymakers and government bodies, institutions and foundations. In digital assets, active since 2015, working with founders and builders across tokenised ecosystems (L1-L3), DeFi, AI, legal and compliance teams, across real estate, agriculture, carbon, infrastructure, IP, education, health, and the arts.
    INSTITUTIONAL AFFILIATIONS & NETWORKS
    University of Leeds (PhD, School of Law) · University of East Anglia (LLM, School of Law) · IFA — International Fiscal Association · IBFD — International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation · IBA — International Bar Association · OECD tax policy and governance networks · UNESCO cultural policy and governance networks · European Film Forum · European Audiovisual Observatory · CISAC · WIPO — World Intellectual Property Organization · Digital assets and tokenisation regulatory networks (EU, UK, Lusophone markets) · MoroAK — Co-Founder & Educator Zero · Active practice across EU · UK · Australia · Americas (Canada · US · Mexico · Brazil · Chile) · Asia-Pacific (Singapore · Hong Kong · Japan).
    PUBLISHING INFRASTRUCTURE
    Published through MoroAK Professional Knowledge Infrastructure · moroak.com · All courses, cohorts, papers, and digital toolkits available through Evelyse Carvalho-Ribas' educator profile on MoroAK's platform. For advisory enquiries and mandate scoping, contact through evelyse@moroak.com.

    Abstract

    Legal and regulatory classification of blockchain and Web3 systems has historically proceeded from surface characteristics — technical claims, economic narratives, or jurisdictional assumptions — without prior systematic separation and analysis of the distinct structural layers that compose these systems. This analytical sequence — from nominal labels toward governance reality — has generated persistent uncertainty, fragmented regulatory outcomes, and unstable classifications subject to revision as institutional understanding evolves.1

    This paper inverts the analytical sequence. Rather than beginning with regulatory categories and asking whether a blockchain system fits within them, it begins with the structural architecture of the system itself: decomposing its technical infrastructure, token mechanics, economic incentive design, legal rights and obligations, governance arrangements, and jurisdictional exposure into six analytically distinct layers. Each layer operates under different institutional mandates, engages different regulatory authorities, and generates different legal consequences — yet the layers interact continuously and cannot be assessed in isolation without distorting the regulatory analysis.2

    The six-layer decomposition — Infrastructure, Token Classification, Economic, Legal, Governance, and Jurisdictional — provides a practical framework for this analysis, rendering visible the points at which layers interact, the misalignments that may create regulatory vulnerability, and the opportunities for governance redesign that may reduce institutional concern without compromising functionality. The Multi-Layer Governance Framework for Blockchain and Digital Assets (Carvalho-Ribas) operationalises this approach by providing professionals, regulators, and policymakers with a shared vocabulary and analytical method for assessing how these systems are actually constructed, how authority and responsibility are distributed, and where gaps between governance design and legal expectations are likely to create friction or enforcement risk.3

    The paper draws on regulatory regimes and supervisory practices across the European Union (MiCA, MiFID II, DAC8), the United Kingdom (FSMA 2023, FCA guidance), the United States (SEC enforcement and evolving policy), Singapore (Payment Services Act and stablecoin framework), Hong Kong (AMLO Part 5A), Japan (FIEA and PSA amendments), Australia (ASIC INFO 225 and token mapping), and Brazil (Lei 14.478/2022), alongside international frameworks including OECD CARF, FATF Recommendation 15, and emerging cross-border tax transparency obligations. It is intended for advanced professional audiences who are required to decide, classify, approve, audit, supervise, or regulate digital asset structures across multiple legal orders simultaneously.


    Blockchain · Web3 · Digital Assets · Structural Layers · Governance Architecture · Token Classification · Legal Classification · Regulatory Perimeter · MiCA · DAOs · Decentralised Finance · Institutional Analysis · Cross-Border Regulation · Multi-Layer Framework

    Carvalho-Ribas, Evelyse. ‘The Structural Architecture of Blockchain and Web3 Systems: Layered Analysis for Legal and Regulatory Classification’. DA-02. ECR-Digital Assets Series. Published through MoroAK Professional Knowledge Infrastructure, 2026. Available at moroak.com.

    Definitions

    This section establishes the operative definitions used throughout the paper. Consistent with DA-01, definitions are functional, governance-oriented, and system-neutral. They are constructed to support structural analysis rather than to reproduce the classificatory preferences of any single regulatory authority. Where official legal definitions exist, they are referenced accordingly. Where definitions are developed for the purposes of this paper, they are expressly identified as workable analytical definitions supporting governance-grade legal analysis across jurisdictions.4

    Blockchain System
    A distributed computational system in which cryptographically signed transactions are recorded in data blocks, sequentially linked, replicated across a network of nodes, and updated through a consensus mechanism.5 For purposes of this paper, a blockchain system encompasses not only the technical protocol but also the governance arrangements, economic incentive structures, legal relationships, and jurisdictional exposures that collectively determine how the system operates, who controls it, and what legal obligations attach to its participants.
    Structural Layer
    An analytically distinct dimension of a blockchain or Web3 system that is subject to different institutional mandates, engages different regulatory authorities, and generates different legal consequences. The six structural layers identified in this paper — Infrastructure, Token Classification, Economic, Legal, Governance, and Jurisdictional — are conceptually separable but functionally interdependent. Structural analysis requires examining each layer independently and then assessing their interactions.
    Infrastructure Layer (L1–L3)
    The technical architecture of a blockchain system, comprising the protocol layer (consensus mechanisms, cryptographic primitives, data structures), the execution layer (smart contracts, state management, transaction processing), and the application and service layer (user interfaces, custody solutions, bridges, oracles, scalability solutions). This paper examines the Infrastructure Layer not for its technical specifications but for how architectural choices enable, constrain, or obscure legal accountability and institutional oversight.6
    Token Classification
    The legal qualification of a token or crypto-asset as a ‘security’, ‘commodity’, ‘utility’, ‘payment instrument’, ‘electronic money’, or other regulatory category. Under this paper, token classification is treated as a structural exercise — informed by the interaction of the Economic, Governance, Legal, and Jurisdictional layers — rather than a nominalist or documentary exercise based on whitepaper claims or protocol-level self-descriptions. Classification divorced from structural context is unstable and vulnerable to revision.7
    Economic Layer
    The mechanisms through which value is created, allocated, captured, and distributed within a blockchain system. This includes token issuance and distribution, vesting schedules, staking and reward mechanisms, treasury management, protocol-level revenues, developer compensation, and the incentive structures that motivate participation and network growth. From a legal and institutional perspective, the Economic Layer is essential to tax assessment, financial regulatory classification, and institutional assessment of control and governance alignment.8
    Legal Layer
    The rights, claims, obligations, and liabilities that arise in connection with participation in a blockchain system and holding of tokens. These include property rights (ownership, custody, transfer), contractual rights and obligations (protocol rules, terms of service, governance documents), tortious liabilities (negligence, breaches of duty), criminal exposures (market manipulation, fraud, money laundering), regulatory compliance obligations (AML/CFT, disclosure, conduct of business), and tax obligations.9
    Governance Layer
    The allocation of decision-making power, control mechanisms, and accountability within a blockchain system. This encompasses formal governance organs (boards, foundations, protocol governance through token voting or delegated voting, DAOs, stakeholder councils) and de facto control arrangements (developer dominance, validator authority, key custodian functions, treasury management by concentrated parties, off-chain coordination by core teams). Regulatory and institutional practice consistently prioritises governance realities over technical features or decentralisation narratives.10
    Jurisdictional Layer
    The dimension addressing how legal authority, supervisory competence, and enforcement power attach to a blockchain system and its participants. This encompasses territorial jurisdiction, nexus, extraterritorial reach, and the mechanisms through which multiple legal orders assert claims over a single distributed or semi-distributed system. For blockchain systems operating across multiple jurisdictions, the Jurisdictional Layer creates cumulative compliance burdens and requires sophisticated assessment of where regulators can assert control and where enforcement pressure is likely to materialise.11

    Why Structural Separation Precedes Legal Classification

    The standard approach to digital asset regulation begins with classification: ‘What is this token?’, ‘Which regulatory regime does it fall into?’, ‘Is it a security, a payment instrument, or a utility?’ This approach assumes that legal categories can be applied directly to digital assets without first understanding the structural architecture of the system within which those assets exist and function. In practice, this assumption fails repeatedly — producing classifications that are unstable, contested, and vulnerable to revision as institutional understanding deepens.12

    The reason for this persistent instability is structural: digital assets are not discrete regulatory objects. They are components of multi-layered systems in which technical architecture, economic incentives, governance arrangements, legal obligations, and jurisdictional exposure interact continuously. A token’s legal classification depends not only on its formal characteristics but on who controls the system, how value is distributed, what governance mechanisms actually operate (as distinct from those claimed), and how multiple jurisdictions assert authority over different aspects of the same system. Classification that ignores these structural dimensions captures only a fraction of the regulatory reality.

    Key Structural Question: If legal classification depends on governance realities, economic substance, and jurisdictional exposure — not merely on the token’s formal label — then structural decomposition must precede classification, not follow it.

    This paper proposes that structural separation is the prerequisite for reliable legal classification. Before asking ‘what is this token?’, the practitioner must ask: ‘how is this system actually built?’, ‘who exercises control?’, ‘how is value captured and distributed?’, and ‘which jurisdictions can assert authority?’ Only after these structural questions are addressed can classification proceed on a stable foundation.

    The analytical failure of classification-first approaches is visible across jurisdictions. Under MiCA, the EU’s comprehensive framework for markets in crypto-assets, token classification turns substantially on function — whether the token confers rights to payment (e-money tokens under Title IV), references other assets to maintain stable value (asset-referenced tokens under Title III), or provides utility access (other crypto-assets under Title II).13 But ‘function’ is not self-evident from the token’s description or whitepaper. A token described as ‘purely utility’ may function economically as an investment instrument if its value derives from network growth, scarcity mechanisms, or the discretionary decisions of a concentrated group of developers or validators. The structural context determines the regulatory outcome.

    The SEC’s enforcement-driven approach in the United States illustrates the same point from a different direction. The Howey test asks whether there is an ‘investment of money in a common enterprise with an expectation of profits derived from the efforts of others’.14 In SEC v. Ripple Labs, the court distinguished between programmatic sales of XRP on public exchanges — where purchasers did not have a reasonable expectation of receiving profits from Ripple’s efforts — and institutional sales directly from Ripple, which did constitute unregistered securities offerings.15 This bifurcated outcome demonstrates that the same token can receive different regulatory treatment depending on the channel of distribution, the nature of the counterparty relationship, and the economic substance of the transaction — all structural variables that a classification-first approach fails to capture.

    Singapore’s Payment Services Act 2019 (as amended 2021) classifies digital payment tokens as a distinct category for licensing purposes, while the Monetary Authority of Singapore’s stablecoin framework (August 2023) imposes additional structural requirements — including reserve composition, capital adequacy, and redemption mechanisms — that determine whether a stablecoin can be marketed as ‘MAS-regulated’.16 In Hong Kong, the VASP licensing regime under the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Ordinance (AMLO Part 5A, effective 1 June 2023) regulates centralised virtual asset trading platforms rather than classifying individual tokens — a regulatory approach that targets the institutional structure of intermediaries rather than the characteristics of assets.17

    Across all of these jurisdictions, the pattern is the same: regulatory outcomes are determined not by the token’s label but by the structural architecture of the system, the governance arrangements that control it, the economic substance of the relationships it creates, and the jurisdictional channels through which authority is exercised. Structural analysis must precede classification.

    Jurisdiction Primary Framework Classification Approach Structural Variables
    EU MiCA (Reg. 2023/1114) Function-based: ART, EMT, utility tokens (Titles II–IV) Economic substance, reserve composition, issuer governance
    UK FSMA 2023 + FCA PS19/22 Perimeter-based: security tokens, e-money tokens, unregulated tokens Rights conferred, economic function, platform regulation
    US Howey test (SEC enforcement) Substance-based: investment contract analysis per transaction channel Distribution channel, counterparty relationship, profit expectation source
    Singapore PSA 2019 (amended 2021) Licensing-based: digital payment token services, stablecoin framework Service provider structure, reserve requirements, capital adequacy
    Hong Kong AMLO Part 5A (SFC) Platform-based: VASP licensing for centralised exchanges Intermediary governance, custody arrangements, retail access criteria
    Japan PSA + FIEA Dual-track: crypto-assets (PSA) vs security tokens (FIEA) Investment characteristics, stablecoin issuer type, exchange registration
    Australia ASIC INFO 225 + Corporations Act Substance-based: financial product test applied to crypto-assets Token mapping taxonomy, platform licensing, managed investment scheme test
    Brazil Lei 14.478/2022 Service provider licensing + securities perimeter (CVM) BCB authorisation, economic substance, CVM securities qualification
    CONCEPTUAL BOUNDARIES AND SCOPE
    This paper does not constitute investment, financial, or tax advice. It does not provide jurisdiction-specific compliance checklists. The structural analysis is intended for advanced professional audiences — including lawyers, tax advisers, regulators, supervisory authorities, policy designers, and senior compliance officers — who require a governance-grade analytical framework for assessing blockchain and digital asset systems across multiple legal orders. All regulatory references are current as at the date of publication and should be verified against the most recent legislative texts and regulatory guidance in each jurisdiction.

    The Infrastructure Layer and Token Classification

    III.A — The Infrastructure Layer (L1–L3)

    The Infrastructure Layer comprises three sub-layers: the protocol layer (consensus mechanisms, cryptographic primitives, data structures), the execution layer (smart contracts, state management, transaction processing), and the application and service layer (user interfaces, custody solutions, bridges, oracles, scalability solutions). Collectively, these layers define what a blockchain system technically allows, prevents, or makes difficult for participants to accomplish.18

    From a regulatory and governance perspective, the Infrastructure Layer is examined not for its technical specifications, but for how architectural choices enable, constrain, or obscure legal accountability and institutional oversight. This distinction is crucial: a cryptographically secure protocol does not, by itself, establish legal responsibility or reduce regulatory risk if the governance, economic, or jurisdictional layers contain concentrated control or asymmetric benefit distribution. Conversely, decentralised or distributed technical architecture does not eliminate legal exposure if off-chain governance, intermediary involvement, or value concentration creates identifiable points of control or benefit.

    INFRASTRUCTURE LAYER: THREE SUB-LAYERS (L1–L3)
    L3 — APPLICATION
    User interfaces, custody solutions, bridges, oracles, scalability solutions, DEX aggregators. Regulatory relevance: Primary points of AML/CFT compliance, consumer protection, and financial promotion regulation (e.g., FCA PS23/6, MiCA Title V CASP obligations).
    L2 — EXECUTION
    Smart contracts, state management, transaction processing, rollups, sidechains. Regulatory relevance: Code-as-governance raises questions about liability for bugs, upgrade authority, and whether smart contract deployers are identifiable ‘persons’ for enforcement purposes.
    L1 — PROTOCOL
    Consensus mechanisms (PoW/PoS/DPoS), cryptographic primitives, data structures, block production. Regulatory relevance: Permissionless vs permissioned determines AML/CFT obligations; validator selection and fee setting affect de facto control assessment; finality characteristics have legal significance for settlement.

    Key regulatory implications of the Infrastructure Layer include: (1) whether the system is permissionless or permissioned, affecting financial regulation classification and AML/CFT obligations; (2) whether key functions such as upgrade authority, validator selection, or fee setting are technically decentralised or subject to de facto control; (3) the role of intermediaries (validators, custodians, bridges) in introducing points of legal exposure and institutional jurisdiction; (4) how the technical architecture shapes tax treatment of transactions and rewards; and (5) whether technical features such as immutability or transaction finality have regulatory significance.19

    The Infrastructure Layer does not determine regulatory outcome by itself. Rather, it provides the technical context for the other structural layers — determining what governance arrangements are technically possible, what economic incentives the architecture enables, what legal relationships it makes visible or obscures, and what institutional actors have meaningful control or influence.


    III.B — Token Classification as a Structural Exercise

    Token classification — the legal qualification of a token or crypto-asset as a ‘security’, ‘commodity’, ‘utility’, ‘payment instrument’, ‘electronic money’, or some combination — is one of the most consequential and contested determinations in digital asset regulation. The standard regulatory approach asks: ‘What is this token called, what rights does it confer, and which legal regime does it fall into?’ This is a nominalist and documentary approach, focusing on form and label.20

    This paper reframes token classification as a structural exercise, informed by a prior analysis of how value is distributed, who exercises control, what economic benefits accrue to different actors, and what governance decisions are made off-chain. In this structural approach, the question becomes: ‘Given the governance arrangements, economic incentives, and control structure of this system, and given the function this token actually serves within it, what regulatory classification is mandated by law and institutional practice?’

    Under MiCA and comparable financial regulatory frameworks, token classification turns substantially on function: whether the token confers rights to payment, investment, utility access, or some combination thereof.21 But ‘function’ is not determined by whitepaper claims or protocol specifications; it emerges from how the token is actually issued, how its value is driven or maintained, what decision-making power it confers, and what economic benefits it distributes. A token may be described as ‘purely utility’ in documentation while functioning economically as an investment instrument if its value derives from network growth, scarcity mechanisms, or the discretionary decisions of a concentrated group of developers or validators. Conversely, a token with significant governance and economic rights may be accurately classified as a ‘payment instrument’ if transaction speed and cost efficiency are its primary design purpose and users value and trade it principally for that functionality.

    The structural approach to token classification therefore requires integration with the Economic Layer (how value is created and distributed), the Governance Layer (who exercises control), and the Legal Layer (what rights and obligations are actually created). Classification divorced from this multi-layer context tends to be unstable, contested, and vulnerable to revision as institutional understanding evolves. A token classified as ‘not a security’ on its issuance may be reclassified if governance becomes concentrated, if secondary market development introduces investment characteristics, or if institutional expectations shift regarding the role of developers or foundation entities.22

    TOKEN CLASSIFICATION: FORM VS STRUCTURAL SUBSTANCE
    NOMINALIST APPROACH
    ‘What is the token called?’ ‘What does the whitepaper say?’ ‘Which category box does it fit?’ — Focuses on documentation and self-description. Produces unstable classifications vulnerable to recharacterisation.
    STRUCTURAL APPROACH
    ‘How is value distributed?’ ‘Who exercises actual control?’ ‘What economic function does this token serve in practice?’ — Integrates all six layers. Produces classifications grounded in governance reality and economic substance.
    INSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE
    ESMA (substance-over-form), SEC (Howey test economic reality), FCA (rights conferred test), ASIC (financial product test), MAS (stablecoin structural requirements) — Regulators across jurisdictions apply structural analysis even where frameworks appear nominalist.

    The Economic and Legal Layers: Value, Rights, and Structural Interdependence

    IV.A — The Economic Layer: Value Capture and Incentive Design

    The Economic Layer comprises the mechanisms through which value is created, allocated, captured, and distributed within a blockchain system. This includes token issuance and distribution, vesting schedules, staking and reward mechanisms, treasury management and allocation, protocol-level revenues, developer compensation, and the incentive structures that motivate participation and network growth.23

    From a legal and institutional perspective, the Economic Layer is essential to tax assessment, financial regulatory classification, and accounting treatment. It is also central to institutional assessment of control and governance alignment. Authorities consistently examine whether value distribution corresponds to claimed governance structures, whether concentrated tokenholders have influence proportionate to their economic interests, whether developer or validator rewards create conflicts of interest, and whether incentive structures are sustainable or reflect hidden dependencies on continued price appreciation.

    Key regulatory and tax implications of the Economic Layer include: (1) the characterisation of tokens and token income for tax purposes (capital gains, income, investment, services rendered);24 (2) the identification of value creation points for transfer pricing and nexus analysis; (3) the assessment of whether economic substance justifies claimed legal characterisations (whether a ‘utility’ token truly functions as such, or whether value is principally speculative); (4) the evaluation of conflicts of interest or perverse incentives created by token distributions or treasury allocation; and (5) the assessment of sustainability and systemic risk where participants’ incentives depend on continued price appreciation or the discretionary actions of concentrated developer teams.

    The Economic Layer frequently diverges from formal governance arrangements. A system may have highly decentralised protocol governance while concentrating economic benefits through treasury allocation, fee structures, or staking rewards. Conversely, a system with concentrated formal governance may distribute economic benefits widely through fair and transparent mechanisms. Regulatory and institutional assessment focuses on these interactions: where the Economic Layer reveals concentrated or asymmetric benefit distribution, governance claims of decentralisation become subject to heightened scrutiny, and regulatory classification tends to shift toward more intrusive regimes regardless of technical or formal governance features.25

    Economic Event Tax Characterisation Challenge Jurisdictional Variation
    Token issuance/airdrop Income, gift, or non-taxable event? US (income at FMV); UK (miscellaneous income); Brazil (income tax at receipt)
    Staking rewards Income at receipt or capital gain on disposal? UK HMRC (generally income); US IRS (income per Rev. Rul. 2023-14); Australia (assessable income)
    DeFi lending/yield Interest, income, or disposal for CGT? UK HMRC DeFi consultation (2025); OECD CARF reporting; cross-border characterisation conflicts
    Treasury allocation Value creation point for transfer pricing Nexus and PE risk where treasury controlled by identifiable entities in specific jurisdictions
    Governance token rewards Compensation for services or capital asset? OECD CARF scope; DAC8 reporting obligations; potential employment/contractor characterisation

    IV.B — The Legal Layer: Rights, Claims, and Liability

    The Legal Layer encompasses the rights, claims, obligations, and liabilities that arise in connection with participation in a blockchain system and holding of tokens. These include property rights (ownership, custody, transfer rights), contractual rights and obligations (imposed by protocol rules, terms of service, or governance documents), tortious liabilities (negligence in system operation, breaches of duty), criminal exposures (market manipulation, fraud, money laundering), regulatory compliance obligations (AML/CFT, disclosure, conduct of business), and tax obligations.

    The Legal Layer is the domain in which blockchain and Web3 systems interface with formal legal systems. It is assessed through comparative law analysis rather than through technical description or protocol claims. The analysis must address: (1) what legal rights and interests are actually created by participation in the system; (2) what happens to those rights if the system malfunctions, is attacked, or is subjected to regulation or enforcement; (3) who bears liability for losses or harm, and what remedies are available; (4) how these rights and liabilities are distributed across different classes of participants (users, developers, validators, intermediaries, foundation entities); and (5) how these arrangements interact with applicable property law, contract law, corporate and governance law, and financial regulation.26

    A particular focus of the Legal Layer is the question of responsibility and liability in the absence of traditional intermediaries or identifiable entities. In decentralised or semi-decentralised systems, who is responsible if a smart contract contains a bug that results in loss of funds? Who is liable if a consensus mechanism fails and a hard fork is required? Who manages disputes or compensates harmed parties? In systems where off-chain governance is diffuse or informal, authority may be opaque, and responsibility may be fragmented across developers, core contributors, major tokenholders, and foundation or company entities. This fragmentation itself becomes a source of regulatory concern, as it creates uncertainty regarding liability, enforcement targets, and the protection of affected parties.

    The UK’s Property (Digital Assets etc) Bill, introduced in the House of Lords on 11 September 2024, represents a significant development in the Legal Layer. Building on the Law Commission’s 2023 report (Law Com No 412), the Bill confirms that digital assets can constitute personal property — a ‘third category’ beyond things in possession and things in action — providing foundational legal clarity for ownership, transfer, and enforcement.27 Similar developments are under consideration in other common law jurisdictions, reflecting growing recognition that existing property law categories require adaptation to accommodate digital assets.

    Governance, Jurisdiction, and Multi-Layer Analysis

    V.A — The Governance Layer: Decision Power and Accountability

    The Governance Layer concerns the allocation of decision-making power, control mechanisms, and accountability within a blockchain system. This encompasses formal governance organs (boards, foundations, protocol governance through token voting or delegated voting, DAOs, stakeholder councils) and de facto control arrangements (developer dominance, validator authority, key custodian functions, treasury management by concentrated parties, off-chain coordination by core teams).28

    This layer is often decisive in institutional and regulatory assessment of blockchain systems. Authorities consistently prioritise governance realities over technical features or decentralisation narratives. A system claimed to be ‘decentralised’ but in which a small group of developers exercises de facto control over protocol changes, treasury allocation, or platform direction, is assessed as concentrated governance. Conversely, a system with formal concentration but robust institutional checks, clear processes for decision-making, and transparent mechanisms for dispute resolution may be assessed as adequately governed despite concentrated formal authority.

    Key Governance Question: Where formal governance structures diverge from actual decision-making power, which does the regulator follow? Institutional practice across jurisdictions consistently answers: actual control, not formal design.

    The governance gap — the divergence between claimed governance structures and actual decision-making realities — is empirically well-documented. Research on DAO governance has shown that many nominally decentralised protocols exhibit concentrated voting power, low participation rates, and de facto control by founding teams or large token holders.29 The Compound governance incident of July 2024 — in which a concentrated group of whale voters passed Proposal 289 to allocate approximately $24 million from the protocol treasury to a yield-bearing vehicle they controlled — illustrates how token-weighted governance can be captured by concentrated economic interests.30 The Beanstalk flash loan attack of April 2022, where an attacker used borrowed capital to acquire enough governance tokens to pass a malicious proposal draining approximately $182 million, demonstrates the vulnerability of purely on-chain governance to economic manipulation.31

    Governance assessment is particularly important for DAOs and decentralised finance protocols, where formal governance is often distributed while actual decision-making power may be concentrated. Regulatory and institutional practice shows that where nominal governance is decentralised but actual control is concentrated, or where governance structures lack processes for responding to regulatory direction, regulators are more likely to identify responsible actors, assert enforcement jurisdiction, and require governance redesign.32


    V.B — The Jurisdictional Layer: Where Law Actually Bites

    The Jurisdictional Layer addresses how legal authority, supervisory competence, and enforcement power attach to a blockchain system and its participants. It encompasses questions of territorial jurisdiction, nexus (what connects a system or actor to a particular legal order), extraterritorial reach, and the mechanisms through which multiple legal orders assert claims over a single distributed or semi-distributed system.

    In principle, blockchain and Web3 systems are transnational: participants, developers, validators, and users may be located in different jurisdictions; value flows may cross borders; governance decisions may be made off-chain by geographically distributed parties. In practice, law asserts itself through multiple channels: regulation of intermediaries (custodians, exchanges, payment processors) located in a jurisdiction; regulation of ‘consumers’ or market participants resident in a jurisdiction; regulation of persons or entities providing services in relation to the system; regulation of financial instruments or payment systems; and regulation of providers of infrastructure or critical services.33

    The Jurisdictional Layer has become increasingly important as regulators have recognised that decentralisation of technical infrastructure does not prevent legal authority from attaching. Through regulation of intermediaries — particularly custodians, exchanges, and payment processors — regulators in major jurisdictions (EU, UK, US, Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan) can impose significant compliance burdens on blockchain-based systems, forcing either adaptation or exit from those markets.

    For blockchain systems operating across multiple jurisdictions, the Jurisdictional Layer creates a cumulative compliance burden: the system must satisfy AML/CFT obligations in each jurisdiction where it operates or where its intermediaries are located; must comply with securities regulation in each jurisdiction where its tokens are offered or traded; must respect consumer protection, data protection, and conduct-of-business rules in each jurisdiction; must respond to tax inquiries and reporting obligations in multiple jurisdictions; and must coordinate with regulators who may interpret existing legal frameworks differently or introduce new rules.34

    JURISDICTIONAL COMPLIANCE BURDEN: CUMULATIVE OBLIGATIONS
    AML/CFT
    FATF R.15 and travel rule (extended to VASPs, October 2021). Only ~25% of jurisdictions fully implemented as at mid-2024. ‘Sunrise problem’ persists across jurisdictions with different implementation timelines.35
    TAX REPORTING
    OECD CARF (June 2023): 48 jurisdictions committed at G20; implementation by 2027. EU DAC8 (Directive 2023/2226): transposition by 31 December 2025; first reporting for 2026 fiscal year; exchange of information from 30 September 2027.36
    SECURITIES
    MiCA CASP licensing (Phase 2, 30 December 2024). UK FSMA 2023 powers. US SEC enforcement (shifting posture post-2025). Hong Kong VASP licensing (AMLO). Singapore MAS licensing. Japan CAESP registration. Australia proposed AFSL requirement for digital asset platforms.
    CONSUMER PROTECTION
    FCA financial promotions (PS23/6, effective 8 October 2023). MiCA disclosure requirements. ASIC product intervention powers. MAS consumer protection conditions on DPT service providers.
    DATA PROTECTION
    GDPR (EU), UK GDPR, LGPD (Brazil), PDPA (Singapore). Tension between blockchain immutability and right to erasure. Controller/processor analysis for on-chain personal data.

    V.C — The Multi-Layer Governance Framework

    The analytical power of systematic structural separation emerges when these six layers are examined not in isolation but in interaction. The Multi-Layer Governance Framework for Blockchain and Digital Assets (Carvalho-Ribas) operationalises this integrative analysis by providing a disciplined method for: (1) decomposing a blockchain or Web3 system into its analytically distinct layers; (2) assessing what laws and institutional mandates apply to each layer; (3) identifying misalignments between layers (for example, where technical decentralisation obscures concentrated governance, or where claimed governance structures are contradicted by economic substance); (4) anticipating how different authorities are likely to assess the system; and (5) identifying points at which governance redesign, compliance infrastructure, or operational adaptation may be required.37

    The Framework is system-neutral and jurisdiction-agnostic. It can be applied to permissionless and permissioned systems, centralised and decentralised structures, early-stage projects, and mature ecosystems. It does not prescribe outcomes; it offers a method for making governance dynamics visible and explicable. For practitioners, this means the ability to assess regulatory risk not through checklist compliance, but through analysis of how institutional actors are likely to interpret and interact with the system. For regulators, it provides a framework for coordinated assessment and the identification of gaps or inconsistencies in how different authorities approach similar arrangements. For policymakers, it supports the design of regulatory frameworks that acknowledge structural complexity rather than attempting to compress multi-layer arrangements into narrowly drawn categories.

    Multi-Layer Framework: Six Analytically Distinct, Structurally Interdependent Dimensions — Infrastructure, Token Classification, Economic, Legal, Governance, and Jurisdictional. Regulatory and supervisory risk typically arises where layers are misaligned or where gaps between claimed and actual arrangements create vulnerabilities.

    The Framework operates across six layers that are conceptually separable, subject to distinct legal regimes, and regulated by distinct authorities, yet are structurally and functionally interdependent. By making these interactions explicit, the Framework supports more reliable anticipation of institutional responses and more robust governance design.

    High-Value Domain for Global Practice

    Blockchain, Web3, and digital assets constitute a high-value domain for legal, regulatory, and tax practice precisely because they concentrate multiple sources of legal and institutional complexity within a single operational field. This concentration generates sustained demand for advanced professional judgment, structured institutional engagement, and cross-border coordination — features that scholarship on complex financial infrastructures associates with high-value advisory work rather than routine compliance.38

    From a professional practice perspective, value in this domain arises at the intersection of legal uncertainty, institutional discretion, and multi-jurisdictional exposure. Digital asset systems frequently operate across several legal orders while engaging regulatory regimes — financial regulation, tax law, AML/CFT frameworks, data protection, corporate governance — that were not designed to interoperate seamlessly. Professionals must translate risk and expectations across institutions with differing mandates, supervisory cultures, and enforcement priorities. This translation function requires not only doctrinal knowledge but also institutional literacy and the ability to anticipate how different authorities are likely to interpret and respond to similar arrangements.

    The structural analytical framework introduced in this paper — decomposing systems into Infrastructure, Token Classification, Economic, Legal, Governance, and Jurisdictional layers — provides professionals with a disciplined method for this translation work. Rather than asking ‘is this a security?’, professionals can ask ‘what are all the distinct regulatory dimensions of this system, which authorities are likely to assess each dimension, and where are the pressure points at which institutional expectations are likely to be activated?’ This shift of focus from nominal classification to structural analysis marks the distinction between transactional support and high-value professional engagement.39

    Governance design represents another area of significant value. In contrast to many regulated sectors where governance structures are standardised or prescribed, blockchain-based systems often embed governance choices within the product design itself: token rights and voting mechanisms, treasury allocation rules, upgrade procedures, and participation thresholds are designed as part of the protocol or ecosystem architecture. Professionals who understand how governance architecture translates into regulatory and tax consequences are able to influence system design ex ante, rather than merely reacting ex post to enforcement or regulatory change.

    Jurisdictional coordination and cross-border strategy represent a third high-value area. Blockchain systems by definition operate across borders, yet regulators increasingly assert jurisdiction and coordinate enforcement. Professionals capable of assessing cumulative compliance burdens, identifying the key jurisdictions in which pressure is likely to materialise, and negotiating between institutional expectations — adapting governance or operations to satisfy regulatory mandates in multiple legal orders simultaneously — create measurable value in reducing enforcement risk, managing compliance costs, and preserving operational viability.40

    HIGH-VALUE PRACTICE AREAS IN BLOCKCHAIN AND DIGITAL ASSETS
    STRUCTURAL LAYER ANALYSIS
    Decompose blockchain and Web3 systems into six analytically distinct and legally consequential dimensions. Map institutional mandates, identify misalignments, anticipate regulatory responses.
    GOVERNANCE DESIGN
    Influence governance architecture ex ante to align with regulatory expectations across jurisdictions. Token rights, treasury allocation, upgrade authority, accountability mechanisms.
    CROSS-BORDER STRATEGY
    Navigate cumulative compliance burdens across EU, UK, US, Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan, Australia, Brazil. Identify pressure points, manage jurisdictional risk, preserve operational viability.

    Knowledge and Practice Continuity

    This paper forms part of a structured doctrinal system dedicated to the legal, regulatory, and governance analysis of blockchain, Web3, and digital asset systems across multiple jurisdictions and institutional settings. Within this system, each paper performs a distinct analytical function while remaining structurally interdependent with the others. The series is designed to examine how blockchain and digital asset-based systems are shaped, constrained, and governed through the interaction of multiple governance layers — national, supranational, and international — and through the distinct analytical lenses of structural decomposition, institutional assessment, and comparative regulatory practice.

    From a knowledge and practice architecture perspective, this Authority PDF constitutes a foundational layer, establishing the structural concepts, analytical frameworks, and diagnostic methods that are then deployed through structured professional training, advanced coursework, and implementation cohorts. Each tier builds on prior analytical clarity and institutional literacy, ensuring continuity between doctrine, interpretation, and professional practice.

    Written Paper Professional Training Advanced Course Implementation Cohort
    FUNCTION FUNCTION FUNCTION FUNCTION
    Doctrinal foundation: structural analysis, layer decomposition, governance-based diagnostic frameworks Applied interpretative capacity: multi-layer reasoning across institutional and jurisdictional contexts Integrated governance analysis: Infrastructure, Token, Economic, Legal, Governance, and Jurisdictional layers Execution environment: structured professional practice with live regulatory and institutional engagement
    MODE MODE MODE MODE
    Analytical · Doctrinal Applied · Interpretative Integrated · Cross-layer Operational · Authority-facing
    OUTPUT OUTPUT OUTPUT OUTPUT
    Authority PDF: structural framework, citeable reference, layer-based diagnostic methodology Professional training: analytical discipline, institutional literacy, multi-layer reasoning Advanced course: cross-layer analysis, governance design, institutional navigation and coordination Implementation cohort: live advisory, regulatory submissions, institutional-facing governance work
    AUDIENCE AUDIENCE AUDIENCE AUDIENCE
    Lawyers, tax advisers, regulators, policymakers, compliance officers, institutional analysts Mid-career professionals, compliance teams, advisory firms, regulatory bodies Senior practitioners, institutional advisers, cross-border structuring professionals Advanced professionals, governance designers, policy coordinators, institutional stakeholders

    Conclusions

    Legal and regulatory classification of blockchain and Web3 systems has historically proceeded from surface characteristics, technical claims, or economic narratives, without prior systematic separation and analysis of the distinct structural layers that compose these systems. This analytical sequence — from nominal labels toward governance reality — has generated persistent uncertainty, fragmented regulatory outcomes, and unstable classifications that are subject to revision as institutional understanding evolves and new information becomes available.

    By inverting the analytical sequence — moving from structural separation toward informed legal classification — this paper demonstrates that regulatory risk can be more reliably assessed, institutional responses can be more accurately anticipated, and governance design can be adapted to align with regulatory expectations. The six-layer decomposition (Infrastructure, Token Classification, Economic, Legal, Governance, Jurisdictional) provides a practical framework for this analysis, rendering visible the points at which layers interact, the misalignments that may create regulatory vulnerability, and the opportunities for governance redesign that may reduce institutional concern without compromising functionality.41

    The Multi-Layer Governance Framework for Blockchain and Digital Assets (Carvalho-Ribas) operationalises this approach by providing professionals, regulators, and policymakers with a shared vocabulary and analytical method for assessing how these systems are actually constructed, how authority and responsibility are distributed, and where gaps between governance design and legal expectations are likely to create friction or enforcement risk. This is not a compliance tool or a technical specification; it is an interpretative framework designed to support institutional analysis, cross-border coordination, and the development of governance structures capable of evolving alongside the regulatory and supervisory landscape.42

    In a domain characterised by rapid technological change, expanding regulatory activity, and persistent uncertainty regarding institutional expectations, the value of systematic structural analysis lies not in eliminating uncertainty — which is impossible — but in making governance dynamics visible and explicable, in supporting coordination across institutions and jurisdictions, and in enabling professionals and policymakers to develop and refine governance approaches grounded in institutional realities rather than in technical narratives or nominal classifications. This is the foundation upon which reliable, durable, and institutionally coherent digital asset systems are built.


    Frequently asked

    What does DA-02 add to the Multi-Layer Governance Framework?

    It applies the framework by inverting the usual analytical sequence. Instead of starting from regulatory categories and asking whether a blockchain system fits within them, DA-02 starts from the structural architecture of the system itself and decomposes it into six analytically distinct layers before any legal classification is attempted — moving from nominal labels toward governance reality.

    What are the six layers in DA-02's decomposition?

    Infrastructure, Token Classification, Economic, Legal, Governance, and Jurisdictional. Each layer operates under different institutional mandates, engages different regulatory authorities, and generates different legal consequences — yet the layers interact continuously and cannot be assessed in isolation without distorting the regulatory analysis.

    Why must structural separation precede legal classification?

    Because classification that proceeds from surface characteristics — technical claims, economic narratives, or jurisdictional assumptions — without first separating the layers has generated persistent uncertainty, fragmented regulatory outcomes, and unstable classifications subject to revision as institutional understanding evolves. Separating the layers first exposes where they interact and where misalignments create regulatory vulnerability.

    What does the layered analysis make visible in practice?

    It renders visible the points at which layers interact, the misalignments that may create regulatory vulnerability, and the opportunities for governance redesign that may reduce institutional concern without compromising the system's legitimate function. This is what turns a static classification into an assessable governance picture.

    What is the evidentiary basis, and is this legal advice?

    DA-02 is a comparative legal and institutional analysis in the ECR Digital Assets (DA) series applying the Multi-Layer Governance Framework (Carvalho-Ribas). It is authority research and general information — expressly not technical implementation guidance, a compliance checklist, investment advice, or jurisdiction-specific tax planning.

    WORK WITH EVELYSE CARVALHO-RIBAS
    ECR advises on governance, regulatory, and fiscal dimensions of blockchain, Web3, and digital asset systems. Advisory mandates are structured, jurisdiction-aware, and governance-first — grounded in the Multi-Layer Governance Framework and applied practice across 25+ jurisdictions. Available for:
    → Token Classification & Regulatory Analysis — Structural analysis of token classification across MiCA (EU Titles II–IV), the Howey test (US SEC), FSMA perimeter guidance (UK FCA), PSA 2019 (Singapore MAS), VASP licensing (Hong Kong SFC), Lei 14.478 (Brazil BCB/CVM), ASIC INFO 225 (Australia), and FSA FIEA transition (Japan). Applies the six-layer decomposition to produce governance-grade classification reports mapping legal status, regulatory obligations, and cross-border recognition pathways. For founders, institutional investors, DeFi operators, and digital asset platforms. Enquire →
    → Governance Structure Design — Design and assessment of governance architectures for tokenised systems, DAOs, foundations, and hybrid structures. Applies the Multi-Layer Governance Framework to map decision-making authority, accountability mechanisms, and regulatory exposure across all six structural layers. Identifies governance gaps — divergences between formal and actual control — and designs structures that align with institutional expectations across jurisdictions. For builders, DeFi operators, institutional investors, and policy advisers. Enquire →
    → Cross-Border Digital Asset Strategy — Multi-jurisdictional structuring, regulatory mapping, and supervisory-engagement strategy for digital asset projects operating across EU, UK, Americas (Canada, US, Mexico, Brazil, Chile), and Asia-Pacific (Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan, Australia). Integrates financial classification, tax treatment (including CARF and DAC8 reporting obligations), AML/CFT compliance (FATF R.15 travel rule), and institutional coordination across cumulative compliance burdens. For founders, institutional investors, international tax lawyers, and enterprises managing cross-border token flows, staking, and treasury operations. Enquire →
    → Institutional & Policy Advisory — Structured, governance-based input for regulators, supervisory authorities, ministries, and policymakers designing or assessing blockchain and digital asset regulatory frameworks. Draws on the Multi-Layer Governance Framework and comparative evidence across 25+ jurisdictions to support coherent institutional coordination and evidence-based policy development. For governments, ministries, foundations, and international organisations. Enquire →
    → Evidentiary & Submission Work — Expert reports, regulatory submissions, and evidentiary support for proceedings, supervisory reviews, and enforcement actions involving digital asset classification, governance assessment, and cross-border regulatory exposure. Grounded in structural layer analysis and applied practice across EU, UK, Americas, and Asia-Pacific jurisdictions. Enquire →
    → Expert Briefing / In-House Training — Bespoke briefings and structured training for legal, compliance, tax, and advisory teams on governance-grade digital asset analysis. Covers the Multi-Layer Governance Framework, structural layer decomposition, token classification methodology, institutional dynamics, cross-border assessment, and emerging CARF/DAC8/FATF compliance obligations. For law firms, R&D companies, financial institutions, energy developers, infrastructure investors, and regulatory bodies. Enquire →
    For educational programmes (training, courses, cohorts), visit moroak.com/education

    This paper is published through MoroAK Professional Knowledge Infrastructure. All courses, cohorts, trainings, papers, and digital toolkits are available through ECR's educator profile on moroak.com. Advisory mandates and mandate scoping are handled through ECR's practice entity — contact via evelyse@moroak.com.

    Endnotes

    1 See, inter alia, Van Pelt R, Jansen S, Baars D, Overbeek S, ‘Defining Blockchain Governance: A Framework for Analysis and Comparison’, Information Systems Management 38(1) 21 (2021); EU Blockchain Observatory and Forum at https://blockchain-observatory.ec.europa.eu/index_en; UK Jurisdiction Taskforce (‘UKJT’), Legal Statement on Cryptoassets and Smart Contracts (2019). ↩
    2 See, for example, OECD Model Tax Convention: Digital Economy Updates (2025); Yaga D, Mell P, Roby N, Scarfone K, ‘Blockchain Technology Overview’, U.S. Department of Commerce: National Institute of Standards and Technology, Internal Report 8202 (2018); Ostrom E, ‘Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems’ American Economic Review 100(3) 641 (2010). ↩
    3 For related approach, see Lumineau F, Wang W, Schilke O, ‘Blockchain Governance — A New Way of Organizing Collaborations?’, Organization Science 32(2) 500 (2021); Buterin V, ‘Credible Neutrality As A Guiding Principle’, Nakamoto (2020); De Filippi P, Wright A, Blockchain and the Law: The Rule of Code (Harvard University Press 2018). ↩
    4 The definitions in Section I are functional and governance-oriented. They do not reproduce verbatim any single regulatory authority’s statutory definitions but are constructed to support governance-grade legal analysis across jurisdictions. Where official legal definitions exist (e.g., MiCA Art 3, FSMA RAO, PSA 2019 s 2), they are referenced alongside the working definitions adopted here. ↩
    5 National Institute of Standards and Technology, ‘Blockchain’ (NIST Glossary, NISTIR 8202 et seq, last updated 2025). ↩
    6 Glaser F, ‘Pervasive Decentralisation of Digital Infrastructures: A Framework for Blockchain Enabled System and Use Case Analysis’, Proceedings of the 50th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (2017). See also De Filippi P, Wray C, Sileno G, ‘Smart Contracts’ Internet Policy Review, 10(2) (2021) https://doi.org/10.14763/2021.2.1549. ↩
    7 Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 on Markets in Crypto-assets (MiCA), Art 3(1)(5)–(9), defining crypto-asset categories. For the substance-over-form approach, see ESMA, ‘Advice on Initial Coin Offerings and Crypto-Assets’ (ESMA50-157-1391, 9 January 2019); ASIC, Information Sheet 225 (INFO 225), ‘Crypto-assets: When they are financial products’ (December 2024). ↩
    8 For value creation and distribution within blockchain systems, see Lee BE, Moroz DJ, Parkes DC, ‘The Political Economy of Blockchain Governance’, Soc. Sci. Res. Netw. (2020) https://doi.org/10.2139 https://ssrn.com/abstract=3537314. ↩
    9 On the legal characterisation of rights in blockchain systems, see UK Jurisdiction Taskforce (‘UKJT’), Legal Statement on Cryptoassets and Smart Contracts (2019); Law Commission of England and Wales, Digital Assets (Law Com No 412, 2023). ↩
    10 Van Pelt R, Jansen S, Baars D, Overbeek S, ‘Defining Blockchain Governance: A Framework for Analysis and Comparison’, Information Systems Management 38(1) 21 (2021); Reijers S and others, ‘A System-Based View of Blockchain Governance’ (2023) Information and Software Technology. ↩
    11 OECD, Blockchain at the Frontier: Impacts and Issues in Cross-Border Co-operation and Global Governance (OECD Business and Finance Policy Papers, No. 4, OECD Publishing 2022). ↩
    12 This analytical failure is a core theme of the ECR-Digital Assets Series. See Carvalho-Ribas E, ‘Blockchain, Web3 and Digital Assets: Legal Ontology, Governance Complexity, and the Limits of Analogical Regulation’, DA-01, ECR-Digital Assets Series (MoroAK 2026), sections II–IV. ↩
    13 Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 (MiCA): Asset-Referenced Tokens (Art 3(1)(6), Title III, Arts 16–47); E-Money Tokens (Art 3(1)(7), Title IV, Arts 48–58); other crypto-assets including utility tokens (Art 3(1)(9), Title II, Arts 4–15). MiCA entered into force 29 June 2023; Phase 1 (ART/EMT regimes) applied from 30 June 2024; Phase 2 (CASP licensing, market abuse, remaining provisions) from 30 December 2024. OJ L 150, 9.6.2023, pp. 40–205. ↩
    14 SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). The Howey test requires: (1) an investment of money; (2) in a common enterprise; (3) with a reasonable expectation of profits; (4) derived from the efforts of others. ↩
    15 SEC v. Ripple Labs, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-10832 (S.D.N.Y.). Summary judgment opinion of 13 July 2023 (Judge Analisa Torres): programmatic sales of XRP on public exchanges did not constitute securities transactions; institutional/direct sales from Ripple did constitute unregistered securities offerings. Remedies opinion of 7 August 2024: civil penalty of approximately $125 million. The ruling’s bifurcated approach — distinguishing channels of distribution rather than classifying the token itself — has been highly influential, though it is a district court opinion. ↩
    16 Singapore Payment Services Act 2019 (PSA), as amended by the Payment Services (Amendment) Act 2021, assented to 4 January 2021, expanding DPT service provider licensing. MAS stablecoin regulatory framework, finalized 15 August 2023: applies to single-currency stablecoins pegged to SGD or G10 currencies; minimum base capital of S$1 million or 50% of annual operating expenses; reserve assets must be 100% at all times in cash, cash equivalents, or short-dated sovereign debt. ↩
    17 Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Ordinance (AMLO), Cap. 615, Part 5A (added by the AMLO (Amendment) Ordinance 2022). VASP licensing regime commenced 1 June 2023. Transitional application deadline: 29 February 2024. Licensed platforms may serve retail investors subject to token admission criteria. ↩
    18 Yaga D, Mell P, Roby N, Scarfone K, ‘Blockchain Technology Overview’, NIST Internal Report 8202 (2018). See also Auer R, Haslhofer B, Kitzler S, Mayer C, Zetzsche D, ‘The Technology of Decentralized Finance (DeFi)’, BIS Working Papers No 1066, Bank for International Settlements (2023). ↩
    19 Federal Reserve Board (Allen J, Alley R, Seira A, Watsky C), ‘Governance of Permissionless Blockchain Networks’ (FEDS Notes, 9 February 2024). ↩
    20 For related approach to classification challenges, see Lange B, Governing Blockchain: Regulatory Frameworks and Policy Challenges (Edward Elgar 2023); Hacker P, Thomale C, ‘Crypto-Securities Regulation: ICOs, Token Sales and Cryptocurrencies under EU Financial Law’ (2018) 15 European Company and Financial Law Review 645 https://ssrn.com/abstract=3075820. ↩
    21 MiCA Art 3(1)(5)–(9). See also ESMA technical standards implementing MiCA classification requirements. ↩
    22 Walch A, ‘Deconstructing “Decentralization”: Exploring the Core Claim of Crypto Systems’ in C Brummer (ed), Crypto Assets: Legal and Monetary Perspectives (Oxford University Press 2019). ↩
    23 Zetzsche DA, Arner DW, Buckley RP, ‘Decentralized Finance’ Journal of Financial Regulation 6(2) 172–203 (2020). ↩
    24 OECD, Taxing Virtual Currencies: An Overview of Tax Treatments and Emerging Tax Policy Issues (OECD Publishing 2020). For staking income, see US IRS Revenue Ruling 2023-14 (staking rewards treated as gross income at fair market value upon receipt); UK HMRC, ‘The Taxation of Decentralised Finance (DeFi) Involving The Lending and Staking of Cryptoassets’, Summary of Responses (2025). ↩
    25 See, for example, Allen DWE, Berg C, Davidson S, Potts J, ‘Property Rights, Knowledge Commons, and Blockchain Governance’ in Dekker E, Kuchař P (eds) Governing Markets as Knowledge Commons, Cambridge Studies on Governing Knowledge Commons (CUP 2021). ↩
    26 De Filippi P, Wright A, Blockchain and the Law: The Rule of Code (Harvard University Press 2018) https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv2862wn8. See also Werbach K, ‘Trust, But Verify: Why the Blockchain Needs the Law’ (SSRN 2844409) Soc Sci Res Netw (2017). ↩
    27 Law Commission of England and Wales, Digital Assets (Law Com No 412, June 2023). Property (Digital Assets etc) Bill, introduced House of Lords 11 September 2024. The Bill confirms that a thing is not prevented from being the object of personal property rights merely because it is neither a thing in action nor a thing in possession. ↩
    28 Beck R, Müller-Bloch C, King JL, ‘Governance in the Blockchain Economy: A Framework and Research Agenda’, Journal Association for Information Systems 19(10) 1(2018) https://doi.org/10.17705/1jais.00518. ↩
    29 Fritsch R, Müller M, Wattenhofer R, ‘Analyzing Voting Power in Decentralized Governance: Who Controls DAOs?’ arXiv:2204.01176 (2022). See also Feichtinger R, Fritsch R, Vonlanthen Y, Wattenhofer R, ‘The Hidden Shortcomings of (D)AOs — An Empirical Study of On-Chain Governance’ arXiv:2302.12125 (2023); Barbereau T, Smethurst R, Papez O, Liebenau J, Vergne J-P, ‘Decentralised Finance’s Unregulated Governance: Minority Rule in the Digital Wild West’ (2022). ↩
    30 Compound governance Proposal 289 (July 2024): concentrated whale votes approved allocation of approximately $24 million in COMP tokens from the protocol treasury to a yield-bearing protocol (‘goldCOMP’) controlled by the proposing group. The incident demonstrated vote-buying and whale domination risks in token-weighted governance. ↩
    31 Beanstalk flash loan governance attack (April 2022): an attacker used a flash loan to acquire sufficient governance tokens to pass a malicious proposal, draining approximately $182 million from the protocol. The attack exploited the combination of token-weighted voting and flash loan accessibility. ↩
    32 Schiessl D, ‘Regulating Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs): Blockchain Governance and the Law’ (2022) Computer Law & Security Review 104654 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.clsr.2022.104654; Gasser U, Budish R, West S, ‘Multistakeholder as Governance Groups: Observations from Case Studies’ Electr J (2015) https://ssrn.com/abstract=2549270. ↩
    33 See, for example, Alston E, Law W, Murtazashvili I, Weiss M, ‘Can Permissionless Blockchains Avoid Governance and the Law?’, 2 Notre Dame J on Emerging Tech 1 (2021); Karjalainen R, ‘Governance in Decentralized Networks’ (SSRN 3551099) (2020). ↩
    34 OECD, Blockchain at the Frontier: Impacts and Issues in Cross-Border Co-operation and Global Governance (OECD Business and Finance Policy Papers, No. 4, OECD Publishing 2022). ↩
    35 FATF, ‘Updated Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach to Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset Service Providers’ (October 2021). FATF Recommendation 15 and Interpretive Note to R.15, adopted June 2019, extending AML/CFT to VASPs. FATF, ‘Targeted Update on Implementation of the FATF Standards on Virtual Assets and VASPs’ (June 2024): approximately 75% of jurisdictions had not yet fully implemented the travel rule for VAs/VASPs. ↩
    36 OECD, Crypto-Asset Reporting Framework and Amendments to the Common Reporting Standard (OECD 2023). 48 jurisdictions committed at the G20 Leaders’ Summit (November 2023). Council Directive (EU) 2023/2226 of 17 October 2023 amending Directive 2011/16/EU (DAC8), OJ L 2023/2226, 24.10.2023. DAC8 transposition deadline: 31 December 2025; first reporting for 2026 fiscal year; automatic exchange from 30 September 2027. ↩
    37 This framework was introduced in DA-01 and is further operationalised in this paper. See Carvalho-Ribas E, ‘Blockchain, Web3 and Digital Assets: Legal Ontology, Governance Complexity, and the Limits of Analogical Regulation’, DA-01, ECR-Digital Assets Series (MoroAK 2026). ↩
    38 See, for example, Howell BE, Potgieter PH, Sadowski BM, ‘Governance of Blockchain and Distributed Ledger Technology Projects’ (SSRN 3365519) (2019); Hütten M, ‘The Soft Spot of Hard Code: Blockchain Technology, Network Governance and Pitfalls of Technological Utopianism’ Glob Netw 19(3) 329 (2019). ↩
    39 On the translation function between technical and institutional domains, see Zwitter A, Hazenberg J, ‘Decentralized Network Governance: Blockchain Technology and the Future of Regulation’ Frontiers in Blockchain 3, 12 (2020). ↩
    40 DiRose S, Mansouri M, ‘Comparison and Analysis of Governance Mechanisms Employed by Blockchain-Based Distributed Autonomous Organizations’, 13th Annual Conference on System of Systems Engineering (SoSE) (2018), 195 https://doi.org/10.1109/SYSOSE.2018.8428782. ↩
    41 Christians A, ‘Hard Law and Soft Law in International Taxation’ (2007) 25 Wisconsin International Law Journal 325 https://ssrn.com/abstract=988782. Although tax-focused, Christians’ work on soft-law governance theory is directly relevant to blockchain governance norms. ↩
    42 Ostrom E, ‘Collective Action Theory’ in C Boix and S Stokes (eds), Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics (OUP 2007). Ostrom’s polycentric governance framework provides a theoretical foundation for understanding how multiple, overlapping centres of authority govern complex systems — directly applicable to the multi-layer blockchain governance analysis advanced in this paper. ↩
    43 Brazil Lei 14.478/2022 (Marco Legal dos Criptoativos), signed 21 December 2022. Decreto No. 11.563 of 13 June 2023 designated the Banco Central do Brasil (BCB) as primary regulator. CVM Parecer de Orientação 40/2022 (October 2022) provides guidance on when crypto-assets qualify as securities under CVM jurisdiction. ↩
    44 DuPont Q, ‘Experiments in Algorithmic Governance: A History and Ethnography of “The DAO,” A Failed Decentralized Autonomous Organization’ Bitcoin Beyond (2017) 157. The DAO hack of June 2016 — in which approximately 3.6 million ETH was drained through a reentrancy vulnerability — and the subsequent Ethereum hard fork demonstrated that ‘code is law’ breaks down when consequences are severe enough, and that core developers and validators hold ultimate governance power. ↩
    45 Bank for International Settlements, Sound Practices: Implications of Fintech Developments for Banks and Bank Supervisors (2018). See also Wall LD, ‘Blockchain Challenges and Governance’, Center for Financial Innovation and Stability, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta (2018). ↩
    46 Tan E, Mahula S, Crompvoets J, ‘Blockchain Governance in the Public Sector: A Conceptual Framework for Public Management’ Government Information Quarterly 39(1) (ISSN 0740-624X) (2022); Smith C, ‘Review: Distributed Governance’ (2019). ↩
    47 Hsieh Y-Y, Vergne J-P, Anderson P, Lakhani K, Reitzig M, ‘Bitcoin and the Rise of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations’ Journal of Organization Design 7(1) 14 (2018). ↩
    48 De Filippi P, Loveluck B, ‘The Invisible Politics of Bitcoin: Governance Crisis of a Decentralised Infrastructure’ Internet Policy Review 5(4) (2016). ↩
    49 Kolehmainen T, Laatikainen G, Kultanen J, Kazan E, Abrahamsson P, ‘Using Blockchain in Digitalizing Enterprise Legacy Systems: An Experience Report’ International Conference on Software Business (2020), 70. ↩
    50 Krause S, Natarajan H, Gradstein HL, ‘Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) and Blockchain’, World Bank Group: Washington, DC, USA (2017). See also WIPO, Blockchain Technologies and IP Ecosystems: A WIPO White Paper (WIPO 2022). ↩

    References

    Universal DA Core Bibliography
    National Institute of Standards and Technology, ‘Blockchain’ (NIST Glossary, NISTIR 8202 et seq, last updated 2025).
    EU Blockchain Observatory and Forum.
    EU European Securities and Markets Authority, ‘Advice on Initial Coin Offerings and Crypto-Assets’ (ESMA50-157-1391, 9 January 2019).
    EU European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation on Markets in Crypto-assets (MiCA)’ COM(2020) 593 final.
    EU Regulation 2023/1114 on Markets in Crypto-assets (MiCA).
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    Internet Policy Review, ‘Blockchain Governance’ (Glossary, 19 April 2021).
    OECD, Blockchain at the Frontier: Impacts and Issues in Cross-Border Co-operation and Global Governance (OECD Business and Finance Policy Papers, No. 4, OECD Publishing 2022).
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    Reijers S and others, ‘A System-Based View of Blockchain Governance’ (2023) Information and Software Technology.
    Van Pelt R, Jansen S, Baars D, Overbeek S, ‘Defining Blockchain Governance: A Framework for Analysis and Comparison’, Information Systems Management 38(1) 21 (2021).
    Allen J, Alley R, Seira A, Watsky C, ‘Governance of Permissionless Blockchain Networks’, FEDS Notes (9 February 2024).
    UK Jurisdiction Taskforce, Legal Statement on Cryptoassets and Smart Contracts (2019).
    UK HMRC, ‘The Taxation of Decentralised Finance (DeFi) Involving The Lending and Staking of Cryptoassets’, Summary of Responses (2025).
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    Paper-Specific References
    Carvalho-Ribas, Evelyse. ‘The Structural Architecture of Blockchain and Web3 Systems: Layered Analysis for Legal and Regulatory Classification’. DA-02. ECR-Digital Assets Series. Published through MoroAK Professional Knowledge Infrastructure, 2026. Available at moroak.com.
    Carvalho-Ribas, Evelyse. ‘Blockchain, Web3 and Digital Assets: Legal Ontology, Governance Complexity, and the Limits of Analogical Regulation’. DA-01. ECR-Digital Assets Series. Published through MoroAK Professional Knowledge Infrastructure, 2026. Available at moroak.com.
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    Carvalho-Ribas, Evelyse. ‘The Structural Architecture of Blockchain and Web3 Systems: Layered Analysis for Legal and Regulatory Classification’. DA-02. ECR-Digital Assets Series. Published through MoroAK Professional Knowledge Infrastructure, 2026. Available at moroak.com.

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    Evelyse Carvalho-Ribas · The Structural Architecture of Blockchain and Web3 Systems: Layered Analysis for Legal and Regulatory Classification · DA-02 · © 2026

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